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Foreword 
 
The issue of Australia’s regional air superiority has been the subject of 
considerable discussion and commentary from 2000. The strategic guidance 
outlined in the Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force and the acquisition and 
phasing out of equipment proposed in the Defence Capability Plan 2004–2014 has 
provided the basis for much of the debate amongst key stakeholders.  
The Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Defence and Trade first examined the issue of Australia’s air combat capability in 
its Review of the Defence Annual Report 2002-03. Further to this inquiry, in June 2005, 
the Senate resolved that the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade ‘inquire and report into the ability of the Australian Defence Force to 
maintain air superiority in our region to 2020, given current planning; as well as 
any measures required to ensure air superiority in our region to 2020.’ To support 
the Committee in its deliberations, two public hearings were held and over 40 
submissions were entered into evidence.   
In terms of report structure, Chapter 2 outlines the strategic considerations, both 
global and regional, which underpin Australia’s future regional air superiority. 
Concepts such as a balanced force structure, asymmetric threats, and an 
assessment of regional military capabilities are discussed. The chapter concludes 
that Australia must continue to monitor developments in the region when 
considering new and improved air combat capabilities. 
Chapter 3 of the report considers the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) current 
capability planning, beginning with an overview of the Defence 2000—Our Future 
Defence Force and subsequent Defence updates in 2003 and 2005. An outline of the 
Hornet Upgrade Program follows and its role in the transition to the new air 
combat aircraft is discussed. In concluding, the Committee notes the introduction 
of a new capability is underpinned by strategic policy and the constraints of 
providing a well balanced ADF.   
The withdrawal from service of the F-111 is examined in Chapter 4 along with a 
consideration of the aircraft’s technical and maintenance issues. Also discussed are 
 vii 
 
 
the merits of enhancing the F-111 and extending its in-service life past 2010. The 
chapter concludes that industry could support the F-111 until 2020 but there are 
risks, including the ability to sustain critical skills amongst the current workforce. 
The Committee notes the increasing severity of the risk profile in extending the  
F-111 beyond 2010. 
Chapter 5 summarises the ADF’s future capability planning with particular 
attention being given to the acquisition of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as well as 
any potential capability gap which may arise from a delay in its purchase.  
The report concludes in Chapter 6 with a comparative analysis of the JSF and the 
FA-22 Raptor covering issues such as capability, availability and cost.  Irrespective 
of whether the FA-22 Raptor is available for export sale to Australia, the 
Committee notes the purchase of the JSF is considered by Defence to provide the 
most effective and efficient air combat capability. 
 
 
Hon B C Scott MP 
Chair 
Defence Sub-Committee 
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1 
Introduction 
Previous debate 
1.1 Australia’s regional air superiority has been the subject of regular 
commentary and debate by government, various defence and strategy 
organisations, the media and the general public since 2000 but in 
particular since 2002/03. 
1.2 The Defence Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade first examined issues relating to 
Australia’s air combat capability in its Review of the Defence Annual 
Report 2002-03. 
1.3 The Committee’s report focused on the following topics: 
 The Department of Defence (Defence) rationale for retiring the  
F-111 in 2010; 
 F/A-18 Hornet and AP-3C Orion proposed strike capability; 
 Defence capability prior to the acquisition of the Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF); and 
 the comparative capability of the JSF. 
1.4 The Committee made two recommendations: 
 at the start of the next Parliament, the Minister for Defence should 
request the Committee to conduct an inquiry into the ability of the 
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Australian Defence Force to maintain air superiority in our region 
to 2020; and 
 in 2006, the Government should make a statement focusing on: 
⇒ the most accurate delivery date for the replacement combat 
aircraft; 
⇒ the implications this date will have on the decision to retire the 
F-111 in 2010; 
⇒ the need to ensure that key upgrades and deep maintenance 
on the F-111 continues through to 2010 with the possibility of 
extending the lifespan should the need arise; and 
⇒ the measures the Government will take to ensure that 
Australia’s superiority in air combat capability in the region is 
maintained. 
1.5 In response to the first recommendation, the Government did not 
agree, noting that: 
The Defence Capability Plan makes sufficient provision to 
maintain Australia’s air combat capability at a level at least 
comparable qualitatively to any in the region. The 
Government continues to monitor regional developments 
and, were there a need to, the Government would adjust the 
Defence Capability Plan.1
1.6 In response to the second recommendation, the Government partially 
agreed noting that: 
The ADF [Australian Defence Force] New Aerospace Combat 
Capability is an important issue on which announcements by 
the Government can be expected at key milestones. Similarly, 
the Government will make relevant announcements relating 
to other air combat capabilities such as F/A-18 Electronic 
Warfare Self Protection, Tactical Air Defence Radar Systems, 
and Airborne Early Warning and Control.2
 
1  Review of the Defence Annual Report 2002-03, Government Response to Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, November 2004, p. 3. 
2  Review of the Defence Annual Report 2002-03, Government Response to Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, November 2004, p. 3. 
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Background 
1.7 In the Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force (the ‘White Paper’), 
Australia’s air combat capability was described as the ‘most 
important single capability for the defence of Australia.’ Following 
this assertion, the White Paper proceeded to outline Defence’s air 
combat capability goal: 
The Government’s aim is to maintain the air combat 
capability at a level at least comparable qualitatively to any in 
the region, and with a sufficient margin of superiority to 
provide an acceptable likelihood of success in combat.3
1.8  The paper then noted three major challenges facing this goal: 
 the capability of the F/A-18 would become outclassed by the 
growth in capabilities of regional air forces; 
 the Boeing 707 aircraft would need to be refurbished or replaced 
in order for Australia to maintain an air to air refuelling (AAR) 
capability; and 
 the replacement of the F/A-18 fleet upon its retirement between 
2012 and 2015 would need to be addressed.4 
1.9 In response to these challenges, Defence planned to upgrade the  
F/A-18’s capabilities, purchase Airborne Early Warning and Control 
(AEW&C) aircraft, replace its AAR aircraft, and look at potential 
replacements for the F/A-18 and the F-111 fleets.5 
1.10 Defence continues to maintain and implement these plans: 
 F/A-18 upgrades continue; 
 AEW&C aircraft will be delivered in 2009; 
 new Multi-Rolled Tanker Transports (MRTT) are due to enter 
service in 2009; 
 in June 2002, Defence announced its intention to participate in the 
United States F-35 JSF program with the expectation of replacing 
the F-111s (and eventually the F/A-18s) with the JSF; and 
 
3  Department of Defence, Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, December 2000, pp. 84–5. 
4  Department of Defence, Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, December 2000, pp. 85–6. 
5  Department of Defence, Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, December 2000, pp. 86–7. 
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 in March 2007, the Government announced its decision to acquire 
24 F/A-18F Block II Super Hornet aircraft. 
1.11 In 2003, the Defence Capability Plan 2004-2014 revealed that the 
planned withdrawal date for the F-111 would be 2010 rather than the 
original date of 2015.6 This decision was based on ongoing reviews of 
the F-111s maintenance needs, as well as wing fatigue problems and a 
fuel tank explosion—both of which arose in 2002.7 In addition, the Air 
Force advised Defence in 2002 that by 2010, the Air Force will have ‘a 
strong and effective land and maritime strike capability…[which] will 
enable withdrawing the F-111s a few years earlier.’8 
Concerns 
1.12 The decision to purchase the JSF, upgrade the F/A-18 Hornet and 
retire the F-111 fleet earlier than originally expected has led to a 
number of on-going concerns. They include: 
 a capability gap resulting from the 2010 retirement of the F-111s 
and the planned delivery of the JSF in 2012-2014—which the  
F/A-18 upgrades  and Super Hornet acquisition are expected to 
address; 
 the suitability of the JSF for Australia’s defence needs; 
 the JSF’s capabilities given the fact that it is, at present, a ‘paper 
plane’; and 
 the rising cost of the JSF and the impact of those costs on the fleet 
numbers. 
Conduct of the inquiry 
1.13 In June 2005, the Senate resolved that the following matters be 
referred to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence 
6  Department of Defence, 2004–2014 Defence Capability Plan: Public Version (DCP 2004–14), 
November 2003, p. 44. 
7  Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission No. 4, Defence Annual Report 2002–03, 
Air Combat Capability, June 2004, pp. 5–6. 
8  Minister for Defence Media Release 0142/2003, Defence Capability Review,  
7 November 2003. 
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and Trade for inquiry and report under the following terms of 
reference: 
 the ability of the Australian Defence Force to maintain air 
superiority in our region to 2020, given current planning; and 
 any measures required to ensure air superiority in our region to 
2020. 
1.14 The Committee advertised the inquiry in The Australian on  
2 November 2005. The Committee sought submissions from 
government departments, relevant organisations and individuals. 
1.15 The Committee received 41 submissions, listed at Appendix A, and 
took evidence at public hearings in Canberra on 31 March 2006 and in 
Ipswich on 5 July 2006. Copies of the transcripts of evidence from the 
public hearings and the volume of submissions are available from the 
Committee’s secretariat and for inspection at the National Library of 
Australia. The transcripts and submissions can also be obtained from 
the Committee’s website at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/index.htm 
Structure of the report 
1.16 This report continues in Chapter 2 with a discussion of the strategic 
considerations, both global and regional, which underpin Australia’s 
future regional air superiority. Strategic concepts such as network-
centric warfare and asymmetric threats are examined. The chapter 
concludes with an examination of the regional strategic challenges 
facing Australia and their impact on Australia’s future air superiority. 
1.17 Chapter 3 covers the ADF’s current capability planning including the 
Hornet upgrades. Chapter 4 addresses issues surrounding the F-111, 
while Chapter 5 summarises the ADF’s future capability planning 
with particular attention given to the purchase of the JSF and any 
potential capability gap which may arise from a delay in its purchase. 
1.18 The report concludes in Chapter 6 with a comparative analysis of the 
JSF and the FA-22 Raptor (Raptor) covering issues such as capability, 
availability and cost. Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 are intended to address, in 
part, the debate surrounding the potential viability of an  
F-111/Raptor force mixture proposed in a submission to the 
Committee prepared by Dr Kopp and Mr Goon. 
6  
 
 
 
 2 
Strategic Considerations 
Introduction 
2.1 Strategic considerations, both global and regional, are imperative 
when discussing Australia’s future regional air superiority. 
Government’s strategic objectives are a cornerstone of defence 
policy and acquisition decisions. It is not surprising then that 
strategic debate has underpinned the evidence received by the 
Committee for this inquiry.  
2.2 Evidence gathered by the Committee noted several strategic 
considerations which impact Australia’s decisions regarding air 
superiority. This chapter will group these issues under two general 
headings: 
 contemporary strategic concepts; and 
 regional strategic assessment. 
Contemporary strategic concepts 
2.3 Changes occurring in strategic doctrine directly impact decisions 
being made about the maintenance of Australia’s regional air 
superiority. New asymmetric threats, increased technological 
capability coupled with Australia’s unique defence requirements 
have, over time, changed Australia’s defence strategy. In the case of 
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air power doctrine (but not exclusively) the maintenance of 
Australia’s regional air superiority is being influenced by 
developments in ‘network centric warfare’ and ‘beyond visual 
range’ weapons and tactics. While concepts such as these are not 
new, they do impact Defence’s procurement strategy. This is best 
reflected in the decision to participate in the JSF program. 
2.4 The remainder of the chapter will review several strategic concepts 
which have arisen over the course of the inquiry and their impact on 
the maintenance of Australia’s regional air superiority. They are: 
 network-centric warfare; 
 beyond visual range; 
 balanced force structure; and 
 asymmetric threats. 
Network-centric warfare 
2.5 Network-centric warfare (NCW) is a term which describes how 
information is gathered by a variety of sources and rapidly 
disseminated amongst a connected network of land, air and sea 
forces in order to provide increased situational awareness and the 
ability to react/strike first. 
2.6 One of the reasons for the Government’s decision to participate in 
the JSF program and pursue communication systems such as the 
AEW&C aircraft, is the recognition that modern warfare, and air 
warfare in particular, has become network-centric.  
2.7 Defence has recognised this for some time. In Defence 2000—Our 
Future Defence Force, networking was cited as a key characteristic of 
the Revolution in Military Affairs—the uptake of information 
technology by armed forces, which continues to impact the ADF.1  
2.8 Defence’s submission to the Committee further established its 
commitment to network-centric warfare stating that it: 
… is moving away from a platform centric approach to 
warfare and is moving towards a network centric approach 
with emphasis on information and knowledge superiority.2
 
1  Department of Defence, Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, December 2000, p. 108. 
2  Department of Defence, Submission No. 15, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 65. 
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2.9 Professor Ross Babbage described to the Committee the future of the 
regional air defence environment: 
Air superiority will not be achieved simply by operating 
advanced fighter aircraft. Key elements will include space 
based sensors, high altitude surveillance sensor of various 
sorts, over the horizon radar systems, [AEW&C], other 
electronic sensor systems and so on.3
2.10 Professor Babbage notes that these elements will be ‘highly 
networked’ thereby enhancing the ADF’s ability to maintain 
regional air superiority.4 
2.11 This description echoes Defence’s plan for the future Air Force air 
combat capability. The plan includes three phases: 
 current equipment upgrades and bi-lateral exercises; 
 the introduction into service of a number of new systems and 
upgrades to existing platforms; and 
 the future purchase of the JSF.5 
2.12 Defence expects that the continued systems upgrades and 
acquisitions will ensure that Australia maintains an air combat 
capability edge in the region. The final phase, in particular, is 
expected to provide a: 
… quantum leap in Air Force air combat capability for 
Australia both, because of the capabilities of the JSF itself and 
also because of what it will bring as part of the overall 
networked ADF capability.6
2.13 The advantage of a highly networked ADF was also highlighted by 
Dr Alan Stephens, who noted that the continued integration of 
networked sources in the ADF will result in ‘an unequalled degree 
of situational awareness, which historically has represented a 
combat advantage of the highest order.’7 
2.14 Despite the advantages networking presents to Australia’s regional 
air superiority capability, challenges remain. Dr Stephens 
commented that ‘if network systems are to realise their full 
 
3  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, pp. 26–7. 
4  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, pp. 26–7. 
5  Department of Defence, Submission No. 15, Sub. Vol. 1, pp. 66–7. 
6  Department of Defence, Submission No. 15, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 67. 
7  Dr Alan Stephens, Submission No. 1, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 5. 
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potential, very significant developments in how Defence Forces 
work together will be required.’8 
2.15 Dr Stephens was referring to the need to overcome what he 
described as ‘powerful cultures’ within the individual services 
which have the potential to hinder the effectiveness of joint warfare 
capabilities. Dr Stephens did point out, however, that Australia’s 
individual services undertake integrated operations ‘very well.’9 
2.16 Dr Stephens’ comments were a reminder to the Committee that 
networked systems, while representing a marked advantage in war 
fighting capability, are still vulnerable to a variety of factors. The 
Committee noted that ‘the strengths of the JSF and anything else … 
the network-centric approach to warfare are also the weaknesses.’10 
2.17 Dr Kopp noted the advent of Russian long-range missiles that have 
been designed to destroy AEW&C aircraft. He was concerned that 
unless Australia possessed a fighter plane which could push out 
beyond the network and hunt down fighters carrying these missiles, 
the system could be at risk.11 
2.18 A submission by Dr Jensen MP also cautioned that the ‘jamming of 
the network data links by an enemy would essentially reduce the 
networked fleet to the capabilities of … individual platforms.’12 
2.19 The Committee posed these scenarios to Professor Babbage who 
commented that while these were important issues, new systems in 
development and a commitment to a ‘multilayered’ approach to 
defence would overcome these challenges.13 
2.20 Professor Babbage stated that the advantages to having a networked 
system overcame any potential challenges as long as the network is 
robust, enduring and long-range.14 
Beyond visual range 
2.21 Defence strategists consider beyond visual range (BVR) to be the 
future of air combat. Dr Stephens told the Committee that ‘there is a 
 
8  Dr Alan Stephens, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 20. 
9  Dr Alan Stephens, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 20. 
10  Committee, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 36. 
11  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 6. 
12  Dr Dennis Jensen MP, Submission No. 21, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 248. 
13  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 37. 
14  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 37. 
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consensus amongst air defence professionals that the key to victory 
in the twenty-first century will be to dominate the beyond visual 
range domain.’15 
2.22 In the BVR domain enemy targets are destroyed by missiles far 
beyond the sight of those who have launched them. First detection 
means the first kill. Having networked systems allows for the 
greater possibility of early detection, thereby ensuring success. 
2.23 Air Marshal Shepherd told the Committee that Defence now has 
long-range stand-off missiles and gave his vision of the future: 
I hope that my fighter pilots of the future never get to see an 
enemy aeroplane unless it is in the data-linked image that is 
sent back from the long-range missile as it is about to hit one 
and blow it up.16
2.24 In contrast, Dr Jensen MP warned in his submission that: 
The Department of Defence is being naïve if it believes that all 
air combat in the future will take place in the beyond visual 
range arena, with combat never getting to the merge.17
2.25 Dr Jensen MP cited several historical examples when strategic 
assumptions were proved wrong and noted that even the JSF still 
carries a gun.18 
Balanced force structure 
2.26 A balanced force structure, in the Australian context, refers to the 
need to balance limited resources amongst the Air Force, Army and 
Navy in order to achieve the best possible outcomes to meet 
Australia’s national interests. 
2.27 To ensure regional air superiority, Defence has argued that 
Australia ‘cannot buy an air defence force or an air superiority force 
at the expense of other aspects of a balanced Defence Force.’19 
2.28 The concept of a balanced Defence Force becomes important when 
considering the decision to purchase the JSF, retire the F-111s and 
 
15  Dr Alan Stephens, Submission No. 1, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 6. 
16  Air Marshal Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 60. 
17  Dr Dennis Jensen MP, Submission No. 21, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 249. 
18  Dr Dennis Jensen MP, Submission No. 21, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 249. 
19  Air Marshal Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 54. 
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upgrade the F/A-18 Hornets—all issues which will be covered later 
in this report. 
Asymmetric threats 
2.29 The word asymmetry, in a strategic context, can be used in several 
ways. It may refer to an engagement between dissimilar forces or 
the use of a different strategy to gain an advantage over an 
adversary. In the context of this inquiry, the word asymmetric is 
used to describe threats such as terrorism, information warfare and 
the use of weapons of mass destruction. 
2.30 Australia’s ability to maintain regional air superiority must be 
based, in part, on its ability to counter asymmetric threats. This 
inquiry has examined the impact of asymmetric threats on Defence’s 
plan for the future Air Force combat capability. 
2.31 Some commentators, including Defence, are confident that the 
current plan for the future Air Force combat capability, which 
includes the purchase of the JSF, addresses potential asymmetric 
threats facing Australia.20 
Committee comment 
2.32 The Committee has been provided with a broad outline of the 
various strategic concepts which underpin the Government’s 
decision’s regarding the future air combat capability plan. Australia 
must continue to recognise and integrate new strategic 
considerations, such as network centricity, into its defence planning 
in order to maintain air superiority in the region. 
2.33 The Committee recognises that capability requirements must be 
viewed in the context of both existing and projected strategic 
considerations, as well as developments in war fighting and 
technology. 
Regional strategic assessment 
2.34 Integral to the debate surrounding the best future Air Force air 
combat capability is the strategic foundation upon which the plan is 
 
20  See Professor Ross Babbage and Defence evidence, Transcript 31 March 2006, pp. 26–40 
(esp. p. 32 and p. 40). 
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based. Defence told the Committee that its strategic guidance is 
contained in the Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force.21 This 
guidance provides the basis for Defence planning. 
2.35 Some evidence received by the Committee took issue with the 
strategic basis upon which Defence is making its decisions. This 
evidence provided an alternate view of the strategic challenges 
facing Australia. 
The Defence perspective 
2.36 Mr Pezzullo, Deputy Secretary Strategy, advised the Committee that 
Defence bases its decisions on the guidance it receives from the 
Government. In the case of the future air combat capability plan, the 
strategic underpinnings of Defence’s decisions are based on the 
Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force and subsequent guidance 
from updates such as the Defence Update 2005.22 
2.37 Government’s most recent strategic assessment can be found in the 
Defence Update 2005 under the heading ‘The Growth of Regional 
Military Capabilities.’ This section acknowledges that ‘military 
capabilities in the Asia Pacific region are growing,’ and notes that 
disparities are appearing between the military capacity of larger and 
smaller countries in the region. The report also states that: 
… middle-level powers [in the region] will seek to extend 
their capacity to project power and to gain further advantage 
from networking and the fusion of intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance systems.23
2.38 Defence defines ‘the region’ as ‘the nations and environs of South 
East Asia and the South West Pacific,’ and advised the Committee 
that any operations beyond the region ‘would be part of a wider 
coalition and any capability comparison would require a 
comparison of the coalition capability rather than just that of 
Australia.’24 
2.39 Defence is confident that the current future Air Force air combat 
capability plan, which is explained in detail in Chapter 3, more than 
21  Mr Michael Pezzullo, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 41. 
22  Overview of the Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force and subsequent Defence Updates 
can be found in Chapter 3. 
23  Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security – A Defence Update 2005,  
December 2005, p. 5. 
24  Department of Defence, Submission No. 15, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 64. 
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adequately addresses the strategic guidelines established by the 
Government. 
Different perspectives 
The ability of regional countries to achieve a network-centric warfare model 
2.40 Dr Stephens expanded on the Defence position, noting that 
although countries in the region will attempt to network, as the 2005 
update suggests, no other state, with the exception of India, China 
and perhaps Singapore, can: 
… realistically aspire to assemble the essential combination … 
of high-quality people, advanced technologies, robust 
indigenous R&D [research and development], the right ideas 
and the economic strength.25
2.41 When questioned further about what the Committee considered to 
be a potentially dangerous assumption, Dr Stephens observed that 
Defence Forces in the region faced organisational barriers between 
the services which hindered their ability to implement a joint 
warfare model.26 
2.42 Dr Kopp did not believe that Dr Stephens assertion was a 
reasonable one and cited the following points to support his claim: 
 the large and growing populations of regional countries will 
enable them to source the necessary talent to implement NCW 
models; 
 the standard of education and training across the region is 
improving; and 
 new technology is highly automated and therefore easily 
operable for those with very low skills.27 
Redefining the definition of the region 
2.43 Dr Kopp and Mr Goon are also of the opinion that the strategic basis 
upon which Defence is making its decisions is flawed. In particular, 
they believe that the Government definition of ‘the region’ should 
be widened in order to address new geo-strategic realities: 
 
25  Dr Alan Stephens, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 19. 
26  Dr Alan Stephens, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 20. 
27  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 9. 
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There is a basic issue of how we define the region and how 
we plan our force structure. The idea that the near region—
and this covers the South East Asian nations—is virtually our 
sole concern because of geographical proximity is really 
predicated on the idea that this is the only land mass from 
which you can launch aircraft into Australian airspace. That 
assumption is no longer true.28
2.44 Dr Kopp and Mr Goon noted that countries such as China and India 
have the ability to reach into Australian airspace in a limited 
capacity and that defence planning needs to address this issue by 
ensuring that Australia is able to discourage countries such as China 
from ‘even contemplating a coercive political play.’29 
2.45 Defence’s response to this suggestion reiterated its previous 
comments that any military engagement with forces beyond the 
Government’s definition of the region would be an operation 
undertaken by a coalition of national armed forces. 
2.46 Mr Pezzullo advised the Committee that: 
The scenario [military conflict with China or India] is 
predicated upon a massive erosion of US military and 
strategic capability … and Australia having to operate 
independently beyond our immediate region … [this] is a 
radically different set of circumstances which, I must say, I do 
not necessarily see even in the most speculative parts of my 
crystal ball … The only basis upon which I could see that 
arising would be through a massive political rupture of the 
relationship [Australia/US] … and a massive erosion of the 
US military capability edge.30
Committee comment 
2.47 Regional countries will continue to advance their air warfare 
capabilities. Providing Australia continues to implement new and 
enhanced capabilities and does not underestimate the capacity of 
others, the chances for maintaining regional air superiority are 
good. 
 
28  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 8. 
29  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 8. 
30  Mr Michael Pezzullo, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 42. 
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2.48 Defining a region can be an ambiguous process—the exact nature of 
what constitutes Australia’s region only has meaning within the 
overall context of a particular strategic view. The current strategic 
view is that which is set out in the Defence 2000—Our Future Defence 
Force and subsequent updates. 
 3 
Current Capability Planning 
Introduction 
3.1 In order for the ADF to effectively deliver the capability required to 
support the achievement of national interests and objectives, it must 
be underpinned by a planning process designed to ensure the correct 
and appropriate mix of platforms, systems, weapons and trained 
personnel. The strategic guidance given to the ADF by Government 
determines the manner in which this appropriate force mix is 
achieved. 
3.2 As mentioned in Chapter 1, the foundation document from which 
ADF force planning and capability development decisions are made is 
the Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force.  Strategic planning cannot 
remain static, because the world environment does not remain static. 
Accordingly, the Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force has been 
further developed and built on by the Defence Update 2003 and the 
Defence Update 2005. These updates incorporated guidance informed 
by the prevailing threats and challenges and sought to ensure that the 
ADF remained a force capable of meeting future military challenges.  
3.3 This chapter will examine the strategic guidance that underpins the 
capability development processes for the ADF as well as the current 
capability plan and the Hornet Upgrade (HUG) program. Issues 
involving the F-111 will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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White Paper overview 
3.4 The Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force outlines Australia’s 
strategic interests and objectives: 
 ensure the defence of Australia and its direct approaches; 
 foster the security of our immediate neighbourhood; 
 promote stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia; 
 support strategic stability in the wider Asia Pacific region; and 
 support global security.1 
3.5 Furthermore, the White Paper sets out the capability priorities for the 
ADF to achieve the strategic tasks above. Specifically, Australia needs 
a balanced and integrated force able to deliver two key sets of 
capabilities: 
 Maritime—mostly air and naval forces; and 
 Land—including the air and naval assets needed to deploy and 
protect them. 
3.6 Government decisions with regard to ADF capability development 
are guided by the following principles: 
 operational flexibility—ensuring capability that is broad enough to 
meet a range of scenarios across a spectrum of credible situations; 
 integrated capability—optimising all the elements of capability: 
personnel, training, support, maintenance, logistics, intelligence, 
doctrine, platforms, etc; 
 interoperability—across the ADF and with allies and coalition 
partners; 
 fully developed capability—ensuring that the required level of 
capability exists across the ADF to achieve key tasks; 
 capability edge—more than just platforms and systems, rather the 
effective use of people, technology, training, doctrine, organisation 
and logistics; 
 operational concurrency—the ability to undertake more than one 
task at a time; 
 
1  Department of Defence, Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, December 2000,  
pp. 29–31. 
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 sustainability—underpinned by an effective approach to long-term 
recruitment and retention and a capability industry base to draw 
on for support; 
 technology focus—maximising and exploiting the opportunities 
offered by the information technology revolution; and 
 cost-effectiveness—to achieve the maximum capability at the 
lowest possible cost.2 
3.7 The White Paper stated that ‘air combat is the most important single 
capability for the defence of Australia’ and added that the 
Government’s aim was to: 
… maintain the air-combat capability at a level at least 
comparable qualitatively to any in the region, and with a 
sufficient margin of superiority to provide an acceptable 
likelihood of success in combat.3
3.8 As briefly outlined in Chapter 1, the White Paper identified three 
major challenges facing the ADF in meeting this capability goal: 
 first, the growth of the air combat capabilities of regional Defence 
Forces was assessed as eventually seeing the F/A-18 aircraft 
‘outclassed’ and that this emerging deficiency would have to be 
addressed; 
 second, an AAR capability was critical to optimise range and 
endurance of the air combat fleet, to support not only an air 
superiority task, but also for air support to surface ship 
deployments and deployed land forces; and 
 third, the future of Australia’s air combat capability after the  
F/A-18 reached the end of its service life between 2012 and 2015 
had to be addressed.4 
3.9 In order to meet the strategic interests and objectives of the White 
Paper, to ensure that stated capability priorities are achieved, and that 
Australia’s air combat capability is maintained given the challenges 
outlined above, the Government planned the following: 
 continuation of the upgrade program for the F/A-18 aircraft; 
 acquisition of AEW&C aircraft; 
 
2  Department of Defence, Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, December 2000, pp. 53–7. 
3  Department of Defence, Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, December 2000, p. 85. 
4  Department of Defence, Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, December 2000, pp. 85–6. 
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 acquisition of aircraft to upgrade the AAR capability with the 
platforms also capable of providing an additional airlift capability; 
and 
 examination of options for acquiring new air combat aircraft to 
replace the F-111 and F/A-18 fleets with provision being made in 
the Defence Capability Plan for a project to acquire up to 100 new 
combat aircraft.5,6 
Defence Updates 2003 and 2005 
3.10 The Defence Update 2003 and the Defence Update 2005 further 
developed and built on the Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force. 
These updates provided strategic, capability and force structure 
guidance that was informed by the prevailing threats and challenges 
and sought to ensure that the ADF remained a force capable of 
meeting future military challenges. However, the fundamentals of the 
White Paper remain ‘sound and well-grounded.’7 
3.11 The evolutionary nature of structuring and optimising the capability 
delivered by the ADF is such that some of the challenges identified in 
2000 have been addressed. Since that time, a range of projects have 
commenced, or been announced, to expand and enhance the air 
power capability of the Air Force. For example: 
 upgrades to the AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft; 
 phases 2 and 3 of the HUG program; 
 acquisition of new generation AAR aircraft i.e. the MRTT aircraft; 
 acquisition of AEW&C aircraft and supporting systems  
i.e. simulator; 
 development and installation of Electronic Warfare Self Protection 
(EWSP) systems; 
 weapons upgrades for selected platforms; 
 acquisition of a heavy lift capability; and 
 
5  Department of Defence, Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, December 2000, pp. 86–7. 
6  This project became AIR 6000 – New Aerospace Combat Capability. 
7  Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security – A Defence Update 2005,  
December 2005, p. v. 
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 establishment of Project AIR 6000 – New Aerospace Combat 
Capability (NACC).  
3.12 The Defence Update 2005 acknowledges that the growth of regional 
military capabilities remains a challenge for Australia and the ADF 
just as it did in 2000. Accordingly, Government force planning and 
capability decisions will continue to be informed by such regional 
factors in conjunction with the broader issues of retaining an ADF 
sufficiently flexible to meet a range of contingencies: 
In developing future capability the Government seeks to 
shape a security environment favourable to Australia’s 
interests … It means retaining a technological edge. It also 
means ensuring that the Government has the widest range of 
options available to respond to possible threats.8
3.13 Notwithstanding the projects planned and underway to enhance 
Australia’s air power, or the position stated in the Defence Update 2005 
in relation to managing the regional air superiority balance, 
submissions to this inquiry have expressed concern that the current 
force planning is ‘wholly unrealistic given the developing strategic 
environment, and regional capabilities.’9 The strategic environment 
and the key political, resource and national interest drivers in relation 
to Defence capability planning were discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2. 
3.14 Strategic imperatives, the guiding principles outlined above, 
examination and analysis of the challenges identified and future roles 
and responsibilities of the Air Force, combined with the necessity of 
maintaining a balanced and flexible ADF, have informed Government 
decision-making in relation to Australian’s future air combat 
capability requirements.  
Current planning 
3.15 The current Defence Capability Plan (DCP 2006-2016)10 is the guiding 
document with regard to the future capability requirements of the 
 
8  Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security – A Defence Update 2005,  
December 2005, p. 12. 
9  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 162. 
10  Department of Defence, 2006–2016 Defence Capability Plan: Public Version (DCP 2006–16), 
June 2006. 
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ADF. The Defence Update 2005 fed into the capability review process 
and largely influenced the DCP 2006-2016. This DCP is intended to 
bring the ADF’s ‘equipment acquisition and capability development 
strategy over the next decade into line with [the] increasingly complex 
security situation.’11  
3.16 The DCP 2006-2016 addresses a range of aerospace related projects, all 
of which contribute to achieving a capable and joint ADF. For a nation 
like Australia, with a vast land mass, extensive borders, a relatively 
small population and limited resources, ‘capability decisions will 
continue to emphasise the importance of joint warfighting and of the 
ADF developing as a fully networked force.’12 There were divergent 
submissions to this inquiry in relation to the priority that is placed on 
the pursuit of ‘jointness’ and the faith in a ‘networked force’ as the 
answer to success in future warfighting. 
3.17 In their submission, Dr Kopp and Mr Goon advised the following: 
In strategic terms Australia’s small population base and small 
industrial base, by regional standards, makes it imperative 
that Australia retain the capability to achieve and maintain air 
superiority over any regional opponent … Australia can 
afford to compromise in its Army and Navy capabilities, but 
it cannot afford to compromise in Air Force capabilities.13
3.18 Further, Dr Kopp advised the Committee that ‘Defence have 
misunderstood the relationship between capability and networking’14 
and that the force structure ‘model that Defence are proposing cannot 
deliver what they believe it can deliver.’15  
3.19 The main projects in relation to maintaining Australia’s air superiority 
are:  
 AIR 5376 Phases 2 and 3—ongoing systems and structural 
upgrades and enhancements to the F/A-18 as part of the HUG;16 
 
11  Minister for Defence Media Release 097/2006, $51 Billion Defence Capability Plan for 
 2006–2016, 20 June 2006. 
12  Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security—A Defence Update 2005,  
December 2005, p. 20. 
13  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 175. 
14  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 5. 
15  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 6. 
16  Department of Defence, 2004–2014 Defence Capability Plan: Public Version (DCP 2004–14), 
November 2003, p. 24. 
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 AIR 5409—Bomb Improvement Program—acquisition of a system 
to provide all-weather and improved accuracy delivery of MK-80 
and BLU-109 series bombs;17,18 
 AIR 5418—Follow-on Stand-off Weapon Capability—acquisition of 
a long range stand-off air to surface weapon to improve the ADF’s 
strike capability against fixed and relocatable targets on land and 
in the littoral environment;19,20 and 
 AIR 6000—NACC—this project was established in 1999 in order to 
‘identify and acquire a NACC to replace the air dominance and 
strike capabilities currently provided by the F/A-18 and F-111 
aircraft fleets.’21 
3.20 The remainder of this Chapter, and Chapters 4 and 5, address various 
projects, pre-conditions and planned activities to progress the 
transition to Australia’s future air combat capability. 
Hornet Upgrade program 
3.21 Australia’s F/A-18 Hornet fleet is being upgraded to ensure the 
continuation of an effective air combat capability as the ADF 
transitions to the new air combat aircraft. The AIR 5376 upgrade and 
enhancement program for the Hornet fleet has been underway since 
the late 1990s and will continue until around 2014 by at which time 
the  fleet will have been upgraded. Defence believes that once the 
Hornet upgrades have been completed, the aircraft will: 
… provide a similar avionics capability to the new Super 
Hornet [and] when combined with new all-weather precision 
and stand-off weapons and supported by the new Airborne 
Early Warning and Control aircraft and multi-role tanker 
transport, will provide us with a formidable networked air 
 
17  Department of Defence, 2004–2014 Defence Capability Plan: Public Version (DCP 2004–14), 
November 2003, p. 29. 
18  In October 2005, the Boeing Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) solution was selected 
as the preferred tenderer for this capability. 
19  Department of Defence, 2004–2014 Defence Capability Plan: Public Version (DCP 2004–14), 
November 2003, p. 35. 
20  In February 2006, the Lockheed Martin Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM) 
was selected to deliver this capability. 
21  Department of Defence, 2001–2010 Defence Capability Plan: Public Version (DCP 2001–10), 
June 2001, p. 57. 
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superiority system of systems that is, without doubt, second 
to none in the region.22  
3.22 A brief overview of the HUG phases follows: 
 Phase 1 has been completed and involved: enhancement of the 
aircraft’s communication anti-jamming capability, upgrade of the 
mission computers, installation of an additional data bus, 
improvement in target identification and improvement in 
navigation and situational awareness.   
⇒ Phase 1 also implemented upgrades to the associated F/A-18 
maintenance, software and training support infrastructures.  
 Phase 2 seeks to incorporate advanced avionics and weapon 
systems and includes the following sub-phases: 
⇒ Phase 2.1 (completed)—replacement of the Fire Control Radar 
and introduction of an Enhanced Interference Blanking Unit. 
⇒ Phase 2.2 (approved)—incorporation of a secure jamming-
resistant Link 16 Data Transfer System, a full colour Display 
Upgrade, a Digital (Moving) Map System, the Joint Helmet 
Mounted Cuing System, and the upgrade of the Counter 
Measures Dispensing System (CMDS). 
⇒ Phase 2.3 (approved with the exception of the complementary 
radio frequency jammer)—upgrade of Electronic Warfare Self-
Protection (EWSP), including replacement of the Radar Warning 
Receivers and further upgrades to the CMDS. 
⇒ Phase 2.3C—procurement of a complementary radio frequency 
jammer to finalise the EWSP capability upgrade for the aircraft. 
⇒ Phase 2.4 (approved)—improvement to detection, identification, 
precision targeting and damage assessment phases of counter 
air, strike and offensive air support operations currently 
supported by the AN/AAS-38 Nite Hawk targeting Forward 
Looking Infra-Red pod. 
 Phase 3 seeks to restore the structural life of the aircraft airframe to 
enable transition to the NACC. This phase comprises structural 
refurbishment programs as follows: 
⇒ Phase 3.1 (approved)—the design, development and installation 
of minor structural modifications and inspections required half 
way through the fatigue life of the aircraft.  This phase will 
22  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 39. 
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address the most immediate deficiencies and ensure structural 
integrity through to Phase 3.2. 
⇒ Phase 3.2B (approved)—involves a program featuring the 
replacement of a number of discrete structural components and 
all preparatory activity to conduct an aircraft centre barrel 
replacement program. 
⇒ Phase 3.2C—involves the procurement and installation of centre 
barrel modification kits to provide sufficient aircraft structural 
life to transition the air combat capability from F/A-18 to the 
NACC.’23 
3.23 In addition to the HUG program, the Hornet aircraft will have their 
power projection capabilities enhanced through the acquisition of 
new and improved weapons, as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Specifically, acquisition of the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) 
will equip Hornets with: 
… new ‘smart’ bombs that will provide a state-of-the-art 
weapon capability that can be accurately fired during the day 
or night and all weather conditions.24
3.24 The acquisition of the Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM) 
will provide the F/A-18 fleet with a new long-range air-to-surface 
missile. The acquisition of the JASSM ensures that ‘Australia retains 
its strike capability so Australian objectives can be met whilst 
maintaining the safety of aircraft and crews.’25 
3.25 Dr Kopp and Mr Goon believe that:  
The planning model devised for the interim F/A-18A 
capability is not viable as the return on investment in 
capability and the additional service life is very poor, while 
incurring significant risk.26  
3.26 It has also been suggested that the funding allocated to the Hornet 
upgrade could achieve a better outcome for Australia if it was 
directed towards keeping the F-111 in service. Dr Kopp and Mr Goon 
note that ‘early retirement of the F-111 and the resulting diversion of 
 
23  Department of Defence, 2006–2016 Defence Capability Plan: Public Version (DCP 2006–16), 
June 2006, p. 19. 
24  Minister for Defence Media Release 174/2005, New ‘Smart’ Bombs for Australia’s F/A-18 
Aircraft, 19 October 2005. 
25  Minister for Defence Media Release 019/2006, New Missiles for the Australian Defence 
Force, 28 February 2006. 
26  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 207. 
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F-111 funding to the F/A-18 is probably a blunder of multi-billion 
dollar proportions.’27 
3.27 Nonetheless, Defence remains confident that upgrading the Hornet is 
the best approach to ensure Australia’s air superiority until the NACC 
is in service. This position, including the proposed transition plan to 
the NACC, while maintaining a viable air power capability, was 
previously advised to the Committee during the review of the Defence 
Annual Report 2002–03.28 For example, Defence advised the 
Committee that:  
The reason we planned those upgrades to the F/A-18 was to 
cater for exactly the sorts of developments that we are now 
seeing in the region … Once we have those upgrades I think 
we will be more than a match for the opposition, particularly 
when supported by AEW&C, air-to-air refuelling tankers …29
3.28 Given the strong differing positions between Defence and Dr Kopp 
and Mr Goon in relation to the Hornet upgrades, associated costs and 
the regional strategic viability of an upgraded Hornet, the Committee 
chose to seek comments from other witnesses about the issue. 
3.29 Dr Alan Stephens accepted that the HUG program was an expensive 
undertaking and that there was uncertainty in relation to operating 
the upgraded Hornet should the introduction of the NACC be 
delayed, nonetheless, he told the Committee: 
Unlike the F-111 which has no legitimate control of the air 
role—a very marginal role—the F/A-18 will at least provide 
us with control of the air, strike and a whole range of options.  
The addition of the JASSM—which is stealthy and with a 
range of … about 400 kilometres—is not to be lightly 
dismissed. It would capture the attention of the people whose 
attention we want to capture.30
3.30 Professor Ross Babbage advised the Committee that he supported the 
logic of the Hornet upgrade, including the centre-barrel replacements, 
for a range of reasons: 
The costs of running the F-111 longer are very much more 
substantial [than the Hornet] and provide a lesser return, in 
 
27  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 3. 
28  Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission No. 4, Defence Annual Report 2002-03, 
Air Combat Capability, June 2004. 
29  Air Marshal Angus Houston, Transcript 15 December 2003, p. 51. 
30  Dr Alan Stephens, Transcript 31 March 2006, pp. 22–3. 
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my view, than a rebarreling option … The advantage of that 
is that not only do you get a fighter-bomber aircraft that can 
sustain itself reasonably well through the whole crossover 
phase of JSF introduction … but you also have the 
opportunity of, if you wish, expanding, by strapping other 
weapons on it … It seems to me that that is a better payoff.31
Committee comment 
3.31 Current planning for Australia’s future air combat capability has been 
underpinned by Government strategic guidance with the cost 
effective delivery of capability, as well as balance across the ADF, as 
key drivers. 
3.32 The HUG program, and the introduction into service of the enabling 
capabilities to support the retirement of the F-111 and the transition to 
the JSF, is a highly complex undertaking. The many interdependent 
activities associated with this transition, including the management of 
a potential ‘capability gap’, are all aspects of managing the risks 
associated with the successful maintenance of Australia’s regional air 
superiority. 
 
31  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 29. 
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 4 
F-111 Withdrawal from Service 
Technical and maintenance considerations 
4.1 In addressing Australia’s future strike capability requirements, the 
Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force projected that the retirement of 
the F-111 fleet would likely occur in the 2015–2020 timeframe. The 
White Paper further went on to observe that it would be:  
… unlikely that there will be any comparable specialised 
strike aircraft suited to our needs available at that time … 
[and] the best option may be specialised strike variants of air 
combat aircraft.  This would allow the replacement of the  
F-111 by the same type of aircraft as we buy to follow the 
F/A-18 …1
4.2 The Defence Capability Review conducted in 2003 revised the 
withdrawal from service date of the F-111 to around 2010. This new 
timeframe reflected the rebalancing of the ADF’s structure and 
capabilities that occurred following the release of the Defence Update 
2003 and subsequently reflected in the Defence Capability Plan 2004–
2014. This timeframe continues to underpin Defence planning with 
regard to air superiority and is again reflected in the latest capability 
planning document, the Defence Capability Plan 2006–2016. 
4.3 There has been much debate in the media and amongst air power 
commentators with regard to the decision to change the planned 
 
1  Department of Defence, Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force, December 2000, p. 93. 
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withdrawal date of the F-111. During his opening statement to the 
public hearing on 31 March 2006, the Chief of Air Force addressed the 
issue of the revised timeframe for the withdrawal of the F-111. 
Specifically, he outlined the Defence position as being based on 
minimising the risks associated with operating an ageing aircraft and 
ensuring an ongoing effective balance across ADF capability: 
When you add up the structural risk, the system risk, the 
support risk, the financial risk and the overall risk to 
capability, you have a clear and undeniable question about 
the viability of the F-111 beyond the period when we plan to 
withdraw it. And all these risks increase as the aircraft age. At 
the end of the day, my job and the job of all of us here is to 
minimise strategic risk for Australia. Clearly to go down such 
a path with these sorts of costs is irresponsible, and the 
funding pressures would put at risk our balanced land, 
maritime and air capabilities. We need to decide when to 
retire the F-111 so that we can manage the transition to the 
new air combat capability without risk to our overall 
capability—not be forced to do it at an indeterminate time of 
the aircraft’s choosing. We need to confidently plan for our 
future, not leave it to chance.2
4.4 At the public hearing on 5 July 2006, Defence also advised that the 
revised planned withdrawal date was influenced by maintenance 
issues and concerns that had previously been unknown, specifically, 
the failure of a fatigue test conducted on the aircraft wings. Defence 
commented that: 
Probably the most defining event was in the middle of that 
period [between the 2000 White Paper and Defence Update 
2003]—that is, the fatigue test article failure in 2002 … that 
caused a fairly substantial rethink as to the supportability of 
the F-111 and how we could manage it.3   
4.5 Given the conviction with which many commentators have suggested 
that the F-111 could be upgraded, and its service life extended, the 
Committee pressed Defence for further information on this matter. 
Defence and industry contractors providing the maintenance support 
to the F-111 made the following general comments about extending 
the aircraft’s operational life: 
 
2  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 40. 
3  Group Captain Adrian Morrison, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 5. 
F-111 WITHDRAWAL FROM SERVICE 31 
 
We have updated the F-111 to get us through to a planned 
withdrawal in 2010 or 2012 … Beyond that, its ability to be 
viable in a number of defence scenarios diminishes over 
time.4  
At the moment, we see nothing which would prevent us 
going beyond that timeframe [2010]. However … as the 
aircraft gets older, there is an element of risk … there is a risk 
of having problems that we do need to solve increasing the 
cost, perhaps reducing some of the capability …5
From an engineering perspective, this aircraft is certainly 
capable of performing until 2012 and beyond, but at some 
point, you will obviously need to make further investment 
depending on how far you want to take it.6
… we have made plans … up to 2012.  Probably the 
impediments [to extending] would be things like support and 
test equipment that would need to be upgraded, because 
some of that is old technology.7
4.6 The Committee also sought comment from the Officer Commanding 
No. 82 Wing, a F-111 pilot, on extending the aircraft’s operational life. 
In response to Committee questioning, the Officer Commanding 
stated: 
… from the point of view of a pilot … I believe that the 
amount of dollars and effort required to get a very small 
increase in its current capability is not an option that we 
would want to take up.8
4.7 Where extension of aircraft life has been discussed in the media and 
by specialist commentators, the B-52 Bomber is regularly referenced 
as an excellent example of the longevity that can be achieved through 
upgrades and enhancements. 
4.8 The Committee sought comment from Defence as to why the F-111 
could not be extended in service when the United States clearly has 
the intention to do so with a similarly ageing aircraft; i.e. the B-52. 
Defence advised that the two aircraft were quite different and that 
direct comparisons were difficult, specifically: 
 
4  Group Captain Gavin Davies, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 3. 
5  Group Captain Adrian Morrison, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 3. 
6  Mr Geoff Webb, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 3. 
7  Mr Daryll Macklin, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 4. 
8  Group Captain Gavin Davies, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 6. 
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… they are very different beasts [sic] in the way they have 
been manufactured and in the access to structure and things 
like that. In a tactical fighter aircraft like the F-111, there is not 
a lot of space to get in easily … The F-111 is a very special 
beast [sic] in terms of the type of technology that has been 
used in the aircraft.  If you compare that to, say, a B-52, you 
probably have more airline type technology coming into play 
… Ultimately you have to simply look at issues such as 
fatigue life, wear, the nature of operations of the aircraft and 
so on … Are you operating in a benign environment or are 
you, for example, operating an aircraft at 30,000 feet straight 
and level for five-hour missions or operating at 200 feet in 
excess of Mach 1 and pulling lots of G all the time.9  
4.9 Defence concluded that while the aircraft could be technically 
maintained to 2020, the performance in operational roles would 
diminish and that it would require: 
… a substantial upgrade to not only basic aircraft systems, 
but also avionics and so on, just to give it both maintainability 
and supportability … we would probably need to 
remanufacture wings … [and] if we were going to do that for 
the next 30 or 40 years I think we would want to try and 
redesign it … So it is not impossible, but I am beginning to 
wonder why.10
4.10 Furthermore, in addition to risks to the aircraft and the delivery of 
capability, Defence also believes that there would be risks to 
Australian industry with extending the operational service of the  
F-111. The Chief of Air Force advised the Committee that: 
We know completely the ability of Australian industry to 
support this aircraft now, and we are not sanguine at all that 
a major upgrade would be achievable and supportable within 
Australia.11
4.11 While industry contractors expressed confidence in their technologies, 
workforces and their ability to provide ongoing support to the F-111, 
they nonetheless accepted that there would be increasing risks and 
cost pressures. While approximately 70 percent of the life-of-type 
spares were purchased from surplus United States stock, some of the 
9  Group Captain Adrian Morrison, Transcript 5 July 2006, pp. 12-13. 
10  Group Captain Adrian Morrison, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 28. 
11  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 40. 
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original equipment manufacturers (OEM) are scaling back, or ceasing 
production, of some of the components and parts. In addressing this 
issue, Rosebank Engineering advised that: 
A lot of effort would need to go into components spares but, 
having said that , we are doing that along the way … 
Rosebank has done reverse engineering many times in the 
past where there is no OEM support …12
4.12 In relation to ensuring a timely, and ongoing supply of spares, the 
manager of the F-111 Engines Business Unit commented that: 
Some of those spares would have to be manufactured, and it 
takes companies a lead time of anything up to two years … to 
go back into production … We would have to assume that the 
cost of spares would increase …13
4.13 In relation to spares and ongoing future availability, particularly as 
OEM suppliers cease to manufacture them, Raytheon advised the 
Committee: 
We have OEM suppliers now who are telling us that they do 
not want to undertake these activities in the future … So we 
are undertaking life of type buys now … I can undertake a 
buy now or later, but it might cost me if I do it later because I 
will have to ask that support base to retool and 
remanufacture.14
4.14 Tasman Aviation Enterprises also expressed the belief that 
supportability of the aircraft can be achieved, but that there are 
difficulties, particularly to do with the ‘scale’ of production runs: 
We can manufacture most of the aeroplane. There are some 
parts that we are not going to be able to do in Australia, 
because the technology or the equipment is not here … How 
we come up with ways of solving unique problems that a sole 
operator brings is going to come up in the future, and volume 
is going to be the issue.15
4.15 However, Tasman Aviation Enterprises emphasised that while 
reverse engineering and innovative design analysis has enabled the 
 
12  Mr Daryll Macklin, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 4. 
13  Mr John Duff, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 10. 
14  Mr Mark Harling, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 12. 
15  Mr Andrew Sanderson, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 14. 
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F-111 maintenance teams to sustain a viable spares base, to do so into 
the future may not be possible: 
A lot of the way the aeroplane was built was welding steel 
together in a unique process, certainly around the wings.  
There will be a new technology that would have to be 
brought into Australia …16
4.16 Dr Kopp and Mr Goon submit that early retirement of the F-111 will 
result in ‘significant loss of employment in domestic systems 
integration and aerospace industry sector, including training 
positions.’17 The Committee therefore sought industry comment as to 
the business, expertise and training impacts of withdrawal of the  
F-111. 
4.17 The industry contractors who appeared as witnesses were generally 
positive as to their ability to plan and structure their workforces to 
transition to other aviation business when the F-111 retired, including 
balancing retention of unique technical expertise until the retirement 
date. The biggest issue requiring management from their perspective 
was ensuring predictability of the withdrawal date to enable them to 
effectively and efficiently transition their businesses: 
Our [Rosebank] current plans are that we have to look ahead 
for other avenues … whether it be aviation or whether we 
support it.  But certainly, whatever we do, we will still retain 
the core skills that we have developed and learned from.18
F-111 occupies about 60% of [Tasman Aviation Enterprises] 
… so we are actually diversifying beyond the F-111 so we can 
sustain that workforce into the future as well … so you get a 
way of continuing the skill set into the future, not just relying 
on the F-111. There will be a decline as the F-111 withdraws, 
but we are making sure our forward forecasting is looking at 
where we can take that group of people …19
Beyond the F-111, from an avionics perspective, there are 
only a small number of elements that will be replicated in 
other platforms … Those people and those skill sets will be 
 
16  Mr Andrew Sanderson, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 21. 
17  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 144. 
18  Mr Daryll Macklin, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 15. 
19  Mr Andrew Sanderson, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 16. 
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retained. It is our job as an industry partner to diversify … 
into other platforms as best we can …20
4.18 As the planned withdrawal date nears, different strategies will need 
to be employed to ensure critical skills are retained.  Further, the 
stockpiling of components and spares needs to be managed, 
particularly if re-tooling and re-manufacture is required.  
Nonetheless, all industry witnesses recognised that the F-111 
retirement ‘will happen one day.’21 
4.19 However, as mentioned above, the ability of industry to plan and 
transition from the F-111 to future business opportunities is a major 
requirement, which is based upon being able to work towards a 
known, and secure, withdrawal date. Raytheon referred to this 
requirement as ‘tenure security.’22 
4.20 Finally, in relation to the maintenance/technical aspects of the F-111 
planned withdrawal, submissions to this inquiry have suggested that 
replacing F-111 engines with F-22 or F15/F16 engines, would provide 
another means by which the operational life of the aircraft could be 
extended and the capability effect enhanced. 23 The Committee 
pursued this proposition during the public hearing at RAAF Base 
Amberley. Defence advised the Committee that while not impossible 
to change the engine in a tactical fighter aircraft, such an undertaking 
is not easy: 
When you start introducing that sort of technology, 
particularly with such a small fleet, you end up with all of the 
integration costs but you are not able to amortise it … So we 
have to wear all of the qualification testing, the integration 
and design and so on.  It is a very big program we are talking 
about. As well as that, the scale of the program is such that I 
think, as we went through it, we would suffer significant 
aircraft availability problems … So even if you decided to do 
this today, it would probably be a decade before you actually 
came out of it again.24
4.21 Defence planning therefore remains focussed on withdrawal of the  
F-111, to ‘get off that increasing risk curve at a time of our own 
20  Mr Mark Harling, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 16. 
21  Mr Mark Harling, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 16. 
22  Mr Mark Harling, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 16. 
23  Mr John Peake, Submission No. 3; Mr Adam Lane, Submission No. 19; and Mr James Sadler, 
Submission No. 23. 
24  Group Captain Adrian Morrison, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 28. 
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choosing.’25 Defence added that it believes the biggest risk factor is 
not the risks they are planning to manage and mitigate, but those they 
have not yet anticipated.  
4.22 There has been speculation that the risks as identified by Defence in 
continuing to operate the F-111 beyond around 2010 are overstated. In 
2004, Dr Kopp advised the inquiry into the Defence Annual Report 
2002-03 that Defence had ‘failed to produce a single strategically or 
technically convincing reason for F-111 early retirement.’26 
4.23 Again, in a submission to the present inquiry, Dr Kopp and Mr Goon 
stated that ‘the risks in extending the life of the F-111 are low, and 
well understood due to the extensive taxpayer investment in the Sole 
Operator Program [SOP].’27  
4.24 A submission to the inquiry from Air-Vice Marshal Criss (Retd) 
supported the Dr Kopp and Mr Goon contention above regarding 
good risk management and the subsequent development of 
appropriate risk management strategies: 
Good risk management is all about knowing what you know 
and finding out about those things you don’t know, then 
putting in place risk-management strategies that ensure the 
risks do not materialise. The F-111 operates under this 
strategy in the only true Ageing-Aircraft Program in the ADF.  
We know the aircraft backwards and we know the risks.28  
4.25 Defence does not support these contentions regarding risk.  Chief of 
Air Force observed, ‘There are increasing risks. Those risks increase 
with age. We believe we have those risks managed up to the planned 
withdrawal date.’29  
 
25  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 44. 
26  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 4 June 2004, p. 99. 
27  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 133. 
28  Air-Vice Marshal Criss (Retd), Submission No. 38, Sub. Vol. 3, p. 488. 
29  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 44. 
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4.26 The F-111 SOP30 has enabled the RAAF to develop ‘an excellent 
understanding of what it takes to operate and maintain it … [but] we 
know there are significant issues to be addressed to extend its life ...’31 
Defence believes that the research and activities that have been, and 
continue to be, undertaken as part of the SOP, are effectively keeping 
the F-111 going until the planned withdrawal around 2010, not that 
the program itself presents the means by which the aircraft life should 
be extended much beyond that time. 
4.27 During the public hearing at RAAF Base Amberley, the F-111 
maintenance support teams, contractor and Defence witnesses, 
commented on the successes and positive impact of the SOP on the 
sustainment of the aircraft. They also noted, however, that: 
If there is a problem that nobody has foreseen … we will be 
the first people to find it [and] … if something does occur, we 
may not necessarily get a forecast of it … We are certainly 
better informed than we were, but there can never be a rock 
solid guarantee that there will not be another surprise.32
4.28 Defence categorised the ‘risk’ issue in terms of three key factors: 
 the F-111 is an old aircraft, is very complex technically and as the 
sole operator, Defence ‘cannot turn to anybody else to help us 
manage [it];’33  
 management of those issues that may not be known, but can be 
anticipated. For example, the aircraft has a test called cold-proof 
loading test which, according to the Chief Defence Scientist, will 
see one or more aircraft fail in the near future and those issues will 
have to be managed;34 and 
30  The SOP was established in the late 1990s in response to the United States retirement of 
its F-111 fleet.  The RAAF, in partnership with the Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation (DSTO), stood up the program to deal with the knowledge issues that were 
going to arise when required to operate the aircraft alone and to fill in the gaps that 
existed in taking the aircraft past where the USAF had been. The USAF retirement of 
their F-111s also enabled the RAAF to acquire an expanded inventory of spares and to 
invest in a number of test programs to identify future maintenance issues.  [Witness 
testimony of AVM Monaghan to public hearing on 4 June 2004 into the Review of the 
Defence Annual Report 2002–03, Transcript, p. 81.]. 
31  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, pp. 39–40. 
32  Group Captain Adrian Morrison and Mr Geoff Webb, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 11. 
33  Dr Roger Lough, Transcript 31 March 2006, pp. 44–5. 
34  Dr Roger Lough, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 45. 
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 management of those issues ‘that we do not know we do not 
know,’35 that is, unanticipated problems the risk of which 
occurring accelerates with each passing year. 
4.29 To assist the Committee’s understanding of the scope of risk factors 
that have to be managed, Defence provided the following examples: 
 the F-111 ejection system is powered by a rocket motor which ejects 
the entire crew module. Rocket motors are a safety critical system 
and manufactured to an exacting standard. These motors generally 
have a safe life of 20 years. The last one that Defence holds was 
manufactured in 1997, with most manufactured around 1994-5.  
Therefore, they run out of life in 2015. To extend beyond that time, 
which would be ‘extreme’, it would be necessary to ‘start up a 
defunct production line and who knows what the cost would be, 
even if they could do it;’36 
 there were exotic materials used in aircraft built in the 1950s and 
1960s that pose unacceptable health and safety issues today, for 
example, beryllium; and 
 pushing the life out much beyond 2012 makes obtaining certain 
replacement parts increasingly difficult, ‘notwithstanding that we 
have got as many as we can from the desert. They would have to 
be re-manufactured.’37 
Strategic/air superiority considerations 
4.30 In addition to the aging aircraft and sole operator issues discussed 
above, ‘early’ retirement of the F-111 is considered by many to be ill-
advised because of the consequences for Australia’s regional security 
once the ADF ceases to possess a long-range strike capability. For 
example, Dr Jensen MP stated that: 
The F-111 fleet currently provides around 50% of the RAAF’s 
total strike firepower … Not only that, but the F-111 is a 
unique asset in the region … With the loss of this capability, 
our competitive edge will be lost.38
 
35  Dr Roger Lough, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 45. 
36  Dr Roger Lough, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 45. 
37  Dr Roger Lough, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 46. 
38  Dr Dennis Jensen MP, Submission No. 21, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 247. 
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4.31 In a submission to the inquiry, Major James Rotramel, a retired USAF 
F-111 Weapons Systems Officer, observed that: 
Whatever you decide to replace your F-111s with, you need to 
acknowledge that you are going to be giving up a capability 
that seems to be uniquely suited to your country’s range and 
payload requirements.39
4.32 The Committee sought information from Defence as to the way in 
which the long-range strike roles and responsibilities of the F-111 
could be managed once the aircraft was withdrawn from service. 
With regard to the roles and responsibilities of the F-111, the Chief of 
Air Force made the point to the Committee that when the F-111 was 
originally acquired it was envisaged that the aircraft would operate 
alone, however: 
That is not the way we would operate with the F-111 and we 
have not done so for many years. So when you get to the 
issues about range … and the reach that we are able to project 
strike … we are effectively constrained to the range of the F18 
[sic] with the F-111 now, because the F-111 does not have the 
situational awareness, it needs to be escorted by F18s [sic] … 
It is not as if we were withdrawing a capability that had the 
power to bomb Vladivostok, say, to replace it with something 
that is much shorter range …40
4.33 The Officer Commanding No. 82 Wing commented that from his 
perspective, as an F-111 pilot: 
… the majority of a modern battlefield scenario will involve a 
composite package of aircraft to get the best outcome. So I 
would suggest that the scope for a lone-aircraft role has 
diminished since we first purchased the F-111.41
Evolved F-111 proposition 
4.34 Differing opinions as to the alternative strategies that could have been 
pursued were raised during the public hearing as well as in the 
submissions received by this inquiry. For example, Group Captain 
39  Major James E. Rotramel (USAF, Retd), Submission No. 5, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 28. 
40  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 57. 
41  Group Captain Gavin Davies, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 30. 
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Cottee (Retd), as a former RAAF pilot who worked on the acquisition 
of the F-111, believes that there is: 
… no significant valid reason why these aircraft should not 
continue through to 2020, at least, considering the large 
spares holdings acquired during the time when 2020 was 
planned as life-of-type. There is adequate expertise remaining 
in Australia to ensure continuing structural integrity.42
4.35 Mr James Sadler strongly supports the ‘Evolved F-111’ option as 
proposed by Dr Kopp and Mr Goon and contends that:  
Replacing the legacy parts that are hard to maintain and/or 
are rare within the F-111, with modern, more cost-effective 
and supportable equipment is the way forward … Defence’s 
argument concerning the F-111’s high operational and 
maintenance cost would be irrelevant if these upgrades were 
implemented, as support costs and maintenance hours would 
be much lower than the present number.43  
4.36 Dr Kopp and Mr Goon first submitted their ‘Evolved F-111’ concept 
to Defence in the late 1990s and believe that it remains an 
economically and strategically viable option. During the public 
hearing they advised that pursing such a program would be feasible: 
The upgrades proposed for the F-111 are principally 
technology insertion upgrades to upgrade the remaining 
legacy systems in the aircraft. The nature of the upgrades and 
the types of technologies that we are talking about are low 
risk technologies ... the remaining legacy avionics in the 
aircraft, which are principally the cockpit, the radar and the 
Pave Tack system.44  
4.37 The ‘Evolved F-111’ option was formally submitted to Defence as part 
of the AIR 6000 project in 2001. Essentially the submission proposed: 
… the acquisition of a force mix with up to 55 F-22A Raptors 
to replace the F/A-18, extensive but low risk incremental 
upgrades to extend the life of the F-111, and acquisition of 
further mothballed surplus F-111s to enhance fleet strength.45
4.38 Furthermore, Dr Kopp and Mr Goon noted that: 
 
42  Group Captain M.J. Cottee (Retd), Submission No. 13, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 56. 
43  Mr James Sadler, Submission No. 23, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 264. 
44  Mr Peter Goon, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 13. 
45  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 128. 
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The F-22A/F-111 force mix is cheaper to implement than the 
plan devised by Defence, as only the F/A-18As need to be 
replaced with new fighters, and the existing investment in the 
F-111 and its extensive support base is exploited fully.46
4.39 During the public hearing, Mr Goon advised the Committee that he 
remained confident in the model development by himself and  
Dr Kopp as it was based on a national interest issue: 
… we want the best for Australia in force structure, in terms 
of defence capability. We looked at that from a variety of 
different directions and put in a considerable amount of effort 
in analysis and reporting. We came up with what we thought 
was, as we still think today is, the most cost-effective optimal 
option for Australia in air power force structure in relation to 
the air combat capability requirement.47
F-111 – general observations 
4.40 Given the divergent positions stated in the submissions and 
testimony of the Department of Defence and Dr Kopp and Mr Goon, 
the Committee sought general comment from other inquiry witnesses 
in relation to the future of the F-111. 
4.41 Dr Stephens advised the Committee that, given his background as a 
Canberra pilot, he did not support keeping the F-111 in service as he 
was ‘not a big fan of engineering solutions to drag old aeroplanes 
along past their natural life.’48 He nonetheless believes that Australia 
should retain a strategic strike capability, and that manned aircraft 
currently still present the best option to achieve this, but that the  
F-111 was not a viable option past its planned retirement date. 
4.42 Professor Babbage cited the risks associated with extending the life of 
the F-111 and commented that it ‘is rather an old air frame. It is 
suffering … from quite serious fatigue challenges.’49 He further added 
that it is ‘not going to be a viable option in intense environments 
 
46  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 133. 
47  Mr Peter Goon, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 5. 
48  Dr Alan Stephens, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 22. 
49  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 28. 
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downstream … [and] would be in some difficulty without an 
enormous amount of support.’50 
4.43 As the ADF’s airworthiness authority, and the officer tasked with 
delivering an effective air power outcome for the Government, the 
Chief of Air Force, used the following analogy when describing his 
position on extending the life of the F-111: 
… taking an EH Holden—a good car in its day—reworking it 
from the ground up, calling it a V8 Commodore and 
expecting it to win first time out at Bathurst.51
Committee comment 
4.44 The Committee understands that industry contractors currently 
supporting the F-111 could manage maintaining the life of the aircraft 
up to 2020, and possibly beyond, however there would be risks that 
would increase over time. For example: 
 the potential for significant cost and capital outlay pressures, 
particularly if components and parts needed to be re-manufactured 
and the facilities did not exist in Australia; and 
 the management and sustainment of a specialised and diminishing 
trained workforce as the core of F-111 maintenance personnel are 
an ageing demographic.  
4.45 The Committee believes that industry contractors maintaining the  
F-111 require predictability in relation to the planned withdrawal date 
of the F-111. This will ensure that business imperatives, including 
transitioning their workforces and retention of critical skills, can be 
managed in an effective manner to minimise potential negative 
impacts. 
4.46 The Committee notes that although there are differing views on the 
likelihood and severity of the risk in operating the F-111 past 2010, 
there is agreement that there are a variety of substantial risks. 
 
 
50  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, pp. 28–9. 
51  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 40. 
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Future Capability Planning 
5.1 The Defence 2000—Our Future Defence Force addressed Australia’s 
national security requirements in relation to air superiority and the 
capabilities needed to ensure an effective Air Force over the coming 
decades. The strategic guidance provided in the White Paper was 
enhanced and rebalanced in subsequent Defence Updates, as 
discussed previously, with the primacy of air superiority essentially 
unchanged. 
5.2 Accordingly, the AIR 6000 NACC project was established to address 
Australia’s future requirements with regard to acquisition of a 
platform capable of achieving the air dominance and strike 
capabilities currently resident in the F/A-18 and F-111 fleets. 
5.3 On 26 June 2002, the Government announced that Australia would 
join the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of the 
international JSF program, as the JSF had been assessed as the most 
likely aircraft to satisfy Australia’s strategic needs with regard to 
future combat air power. 
5.4 Joining the JSF program would enable the ADF to access levels of 
capability and technology that would be a generation ahead of other 
contemporary aircraft. Further, Australia’s participation in the 
program would ensure that Australian industry would be able to 
compete for JSF work and would also provide opportunities to 
participate in the development, production and through-life support 
phases of the program.1 
 
1  Australian participation in the Joint Strike Fighter Program, 
<http://www.defence.gov.au/jsf/> (Accessed 8 May 2006). 
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5.5 During the press conference following the announcement that 
Australia would join the JSF SDD phase, the Minister for Defence 
advised that the decision had been made in accordance with the 
White Paper guidelines.  He noted that the Government did not 
believe that there was ‘any other alternative that would meet our 
capability requirements within the costings that we put into the White 
Paper.’2 
5.6 During the 31 March 2006 public hearing of this inquiry, Defence 
informed the Committee that Australia’s future air combat capability, 
currently planned to be the JSF: 
… will be a highly capable fifth-generation stealthy multi-role 
air combat aircraft.  Defence is confident that this aircraft will 
cost effectively provide Australia with the most sensible air 
combat solution, and, when integrated into the networked 
force of AEW&C and upgraded ground command and 
control systems, will mature to meet Australia’s future air 
superiority requirements.3
5.7 There is public opposition to acquiring the JSF as Australia’s NACC. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, extension of the life of the F-111 is strongly 
favoured as a more viable strike option for Australia’s future, 
enhanced by the air superiority capability of the Raptor.  
5.8 A detailed capability comparison between the JSF and the Raptor is 
provided in Chapter 6. 
5.9 The JSF is considered by many to ‘have limited performance, limited 
agility and limited stealth compared to the F-22.’4 Indeed, Dr Kopp 
and Mr Goon believe it is ‘simply wrong’ that the JSF could serve 
effectively as an air superiority fighter.5 They also submit that the 
aircraft would not be able to ‘credibly fill the diversity of roles which 
the F/A-18 and F-111 performed successfully over recent decades’6 
nor will it be capable of matching the expanding regional capability. 
5.10 As the development of the Raptor and JSF aircraft have been run as 
more or less parallel programs, Defence contends that the JSF is 
2  Ministers for Defence and Industry Press Conference, Australia to Join Joint Strike Fighter 
Program, Canberra, 27 June 2002. 
3  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 39. 
4  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 2. 
5  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 3. 
6  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 192. 
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potentially a more advanced aircraft than the Raptor. Defence told the 
Committee that they held this position because: 
… a lot of the hard yards have already been done in many of 
the systems on the F-22 and they are now being adapted and 
modified for the F-35 [JSF] … The F-35 is a more advanced 
aircraft than the F-22 because it will be taking both hardware 
and software a lot further.7
5.11 Notwithstanding the Defence support for the future air combat 
capability, there have been several submissions to this inquiry which 
have supported the concerns expressed by Dr Kopp and Mr Goon. 
For example, Dr Jensen MP believes that: 
The JSF should be seen as a jack of all trades but master of 
none.8
5.12 The former RAAF Air Commander Australia, Air-Vice Marshal Criss 
(Retd), submits that: 
… the F-22, in open literature, is credited with superior 
performance to the JSF in all respects at near to, or even 
perhaps at, price parity. The F-22 is even openly 
acknowledged by the JSF manufacturer and the United States 
Air Force to be superior and it is already in operational 
service delivering unsurpassed levels of fighter and strike 
capability to that nation.9
5.13 Mr Ken Oaten referred to the acquisition of the JSF as a decision that: 
… compromises our defence posture as we will have no 
means to either sustain a long range strike campaign or to 
stamp our authority on airspace in time of conflict.10
5.14 In response to criticisms that Defence has not conducted sound test 
and evaluation as part of the NACC development process, Defence 
advised the Committee that since the SDD decision was announced, 
significant resources had been devoted to examining, analysing and 
evaluating Australia’s air combat capability requirements and the 
manner in which the development of the JSF fitted with these 
evaluations. Defence stated that personnel from the Defence Materiel 
Organisation, the Defence Capability Group and the Defence Science 
 
7  Dr Stephen Gumley, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 49. 
8  Dr Dennis Jensen MP, Submission No. 21, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 249. 
9  Air Vice Marshal P.J. Criss (Retd), Submission No. 38, Sub. Vol. 3, p. 485. 
10  Mr Ken Oaten, Submission No. 7, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 34. 
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and Technology Organisation, as well as ADO members in the United 
States had been working hard to ‘test the decision and not try to 
justify it.’11 
5.15 As the debate about the suitability of the JSF continues, and while 
Defence reports that this aircraft is currently envisaged as the ADF’s 
new air combat aircraft, Australia has not yet committed to purchase 
it. The first major decision in the acquisition process was joining the 
SDD phase of the JSF program. 
5.16 The second decision, known as first-pass approval,12 was announced 
by the Minister for Defence on 10 November 2006 when he advised 
that he planned to sign the JSF Production Sustainment and Follow-
on Development (PSFD) Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 
December 2006.13 Subsequently, the MoU was signed in Washington 
D.C. on 12 December 2006.14 
5.17 The key remaining decision point in the NACC acquisition process is 
the second pass decision in 2008. Second pass approval is formal 
approval by Government of a specific capability solution to an 
identified capability development need.15 
5.18 During the 31 March 2006 public hearing Defence stressed to the 
Committee that the November 2006 first-pass decision was not the 
point at which the acquisition approval was granted: 
That call comes in 2008. That is nearly three years to look at 
the development of the program, to see how it is progressing 
and to do our risk management approach to see what we are 
doing with the F/A-18 fleet, the F-111 fleet and the arrival of 
the F-35.16
5.19 One final element of the current planning, in relation to the NACC, 
relates to management of the transition from the existing structure to 
the future force. Defence advised the Committee that the transition 
from the ADF’s legacy fleets to the new air combat capability extends 
 
11  Lieutenant General David Hurley, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 59. 
12  First-pass approval refers to the process whereby Defence gives Government the 
opportunity to narrow the alternatives being examined by Defence to meet an agreed 
capability gap. First-pass approval allows a project to be included in the Defence 
Capability Plan and the Major Capital Investment Program. 
13  Minister for Defence Media Release 148/2006, The Joint Strike Fighter, 10 November 2006. 
14  Minister for Defence Media Release 163/2006, Australia Enters Next Phase of the JSF 
Program, 13 December 2006. 
15  Department of Defence, Defence Capability Development Manual 2006, p. 30. 
16  Lieutenant General David Hurley, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 53. 
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to more than phasing out and bringing in new platforms, there is the 
vital aspect of the personnel transition. 
5.20 In relation to the personnel transition planning, Defence noted the 
reality of current and future recruiting pressures, and that it is not 
possible to: 
… just go out and recruit another 200 to 400 intelligently-
trained pilots and maintainers from the street.  It will take 
time to grow those people.17
5.21 Accordingly, as part of the ADF strategic workforce planning process, 
the Air Force needs to manage the move of personnel from the F-111, 
to supporting the NACC. Chief of Air Force noted that the building 
blocks of the plan are in place. The personnel establishment assigned 
to the F-111 would move to the JSF environment, but it was unlikely 
to be a one-for-one establishment shift as there would be savings and 
efficiencies with the JSF. 
5.22 The Officer Commanding of No. 82 Wing has the responsibility for 
operating the RAAF’s F-111 fleet and he advised the Committee that 
the transition process to the future NACC was already underway. By 
way of example, he noted that equipping the F-111 with AGM142 
missiles presents a great learning experience for the Air Force 
because: 
All our electronic warfare development and tactics 
development is directly transferable to the F/A-18—and the 
JSF downstream.18  
5.23 He further added that with regard to transitioning to the future, the 
phased approach to workforce management and training, that is,  
F-111 retirement, capability delivery through the enhanced F/A-18 
and enabling capabilities, and finally, operational service of the 
NACC, was a sound method to ensure Australia’s air superiority was 
not compromised. Specifically: 
The other factor here for me as an operator is that the Hornet 
provides the better stepping stone to a single [seat] JSF or 
whatever in terms of our ability to grow the expertise and 
experience to function in the way we intend to function 
beyond 2015.19
 
17  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 56. 
18  Group Captain Gavin Davies, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 6. 
19  Group Captain Gavin Davies, Transcript 5 July 2006, p. 29. 
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5.24 There has been little public comment from sources other than Defence 
with regard to the personnel and training aspect of the current 
planning for Australia’s future air superiority requirements. 
5.25 Quite apart from the ongoing debate in relation to the following three 
key themes that have arisen during this inquiry: 
 the appropriateness of the JSF decision; 
 the capability of that aircraft; and  
 the proposed F-111/Raptor force structure. 
there has also been considerable concern expressed as to the potential 
for Australia to be without a viable air combat capability if current 
planning falls short of expectations. However, the Government has 
addressed the potential risk by its decision to purchase 24 Super 
Hornet aircraft. 
The capability gap issue 
5.26 The potential for a time-lag between the phasing out of legacy 
platforms and the introduction of the JSF (as the preferred solution for 
Australia’s air combat requirements), requires careful management to 
minimise the impact on Australia’s national security. There has been 
media speculation and public commentary as to the ability of the ADF 
to manage this potential gap. The Committee accordingly pursued the 
‘gap issue’ with questions to Defence and other witnesses at the 
public hearings. 
5.27 Defence reiterated its plan in relation to the Hornet upgrade as the 
means by which the ADF’s air superiority would be maintained until 
the introduction of the JSF. Nonetheless, it acknowledged that the JSF 
program could slip, but advised the Committee that the nature of the 
aircraft development was such that the phased, or block, approach 
provided an element of planning flexibility. The CEO of the Defence 
Materiel Organisation observed: 
I would predict that occasionally a block might get a bit 
delayed, but we would still have an operating aircraft 
flying.20
20  Dr Stephen Gumley, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 48. 
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5.28 Defence added that not only did the ‘block’ nature of the 
development program provide planning flexibility, but so did the 
actual phasing-in of the JSF. In particular, ‘there will be at least a five-
year overlap between the JSFs … and the F/A-18.’21 
5.29 The personnel transition plan is considered by Defence to be an 
important element of the total planning package associated with the 
phasing-in of the NACC. The need to train up personnel as the JSF 
comes into service provides another layer of flexibility to manage any 
potential gap in capability. Defence advised that: 
It also takes time to train pilots, so probably not every 
capability in the JSF would need to be immediately available 
on day one, because it just could not be used.  So there is a 
little bit of schedule contingency in there from a practical 
sense.22
5.30 Central to Defence’s contingency planning is the upgraded capability 
that will be available to the ADF by the post-HUG F/A-18. The 
particular phase of the upgrade program that is focused on managing 
any potential gap scenario is Phase 3.2C, that is, replacement of the 
aircraft’s ‘centre barrels’—the central fuselage. 
5.31 This particular phase of the HUG program has been part of the 
Defence strategy to manage any gap for quite some time now. In 2004 
during the hearing into the Review of the Defence Annual Report  
2002–03, the then-Chief of Air Force advised the Committee that the 
‘hedging strategy’ involved replacement of the centre barrels in a 
number of the F/A-18 aircraft and that a similar program was already 
underway in Canada.23 
5.32 During the 31 March 2006 public hearing, Defence reiterated that its 
gap management strategy involved the upgraded Hornet and centre 
barrel replacements as necessary. It emphasised that by the end of the 
decade the Hornet upgrades will deliver a ‘better capability than the 
one we currently have with both the standard Hornet and the F-
111.’24 The number and timing of the centre barrel replacement 
program would be linked to the introduction of the JSF: 
… the year the JSF comes in will determine how many centre 
barrels in the Hornet we have to do and how far out we have 
 
21  Air Commodore John Harvey, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 52. 
22  Dr Stephen Gumley, Transcript 31 March 2006, pp. 48–9. 
23  Air Marshal Angus Houston, Transcript 2 August 2004, p. 13.  
24  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 51. 
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to take the Hornet. Nevertheless, we cannot keep the Hornet 
going for an extra 10 or 20 years.  So there is a band of 
slippage in there that is within our current planning …25
5.33 The Committee sought the opinion of Professor Babbage in relation to 
the capability gap issue.  Professor Babbage advised that in managing 
a potential capability gap, decision makers would need to balance 
risks in determining a course of action.  Specifically: 
If it looked as though the security environment in the region 
was going to get much worse, maybe we ought to look at the 
sort of options that we are not at the moment seriously 
contemplating … if suddenly we were taken by surprise in 
2008, say, and the F-111s were about to go and it looked like 
we were going to have a gap, it would probably be possible 
for us to do a short-term leasing arrangement—with some 
considerable difficulty—as a back up.26
5.34 While Professor Babbage proposed a short-term leasing option as a 
gap solution, he did not believe that it should be planned for at this 
point in time and that it would not be money well spent. He 
supported Defence in the utility and appropriateness of the Hornet 
upgrades including the re-barrelling option. 
5.35 In their submission to the inquiry, Dr Kopp and Mr Goon highlight a 
risk to Australia’s national defence that could arise in relation to the 
Hornet upgrade’s ‘relatively short time window.’ Noting the extent 
and diversity of the activities to be undertaken as part of the upgrade, 
there is a real potential that aircraft availability will drop with the 
resultant ‘negative effects on defence capabilities.’27 
5.36 In commenting on specific aspects of the HUG program, and the 
implications for maintaining Australia’s regional air superiority,  
Dr Kopp and Mr Goon made the following observations: 
[HUG is] intended to upgrade and enhance the aircraft’s air 
combat capabilities, endeavouring to address the growing 
imbalance in regional air superiority and the resulting threats.  
At the same time, these programs are intended to provide 
interim, albeit lesser, strike/reconnaissance/surveillance/air 
vehicle interceptor/close air support capabilities in place of 
the F-111s which Defence has recommended to be retired 
 
25  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 52. 
26  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 29. 
27  Dr Kopp and Mr Goon, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 122. 
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early … the threat to Australia’s long standing position in 
regional air superiority is further exacerbated by features 
peculiar to the F/A-18 ‘Classic’ and the Australian variants 
…28
5.37 Mr Michael Devlin’s submission to the inquiry expressed concern 
with regard to the viability of upgrading the Hornet as the means by 
which the Air Force transitions to the JSF and any capability ‘gap’ is 
managed. He proposed the acquisition of an interim aircraft—‘at least 
100 F/A-18E and F/A-18 Super Hornet aircraft.’29 A fast-tracked 
acquisition process could see these aircraft in service by 2012, if not 
earlier, and any ‘potential gap in Australia’s defences will thus be 
plugged.’30 
5.38 With regard to the acquisition of an interim aircraft to reduce the risk 
of a capability gap, Defence advised the Committee during the  
31 March 2006 public hearing that: 
Were we to go to an interim fighter for some strange reason—
and we do not expect that to happen—it would cost us more 
than the JSF, so it [the JSF] is still the best value for money, 
not just in a fifth generation sense but when comparing it 
against fourth generation contenders.31
5.39 Furthermore, it was emphasised that the retirement of the F-111 was 
not directly linked to the introduction of the JSF, but formed part of 
the progressive transition from the current air combat capability to 
the future environment: 
We are not transitioning from F-111 to JSF.  We are upgrading 
from F-111 and current Hornet to an upgraded Hornet and 
then to JSF. We need that head space, in a constrained system, 
to be able to do that. We are getting out of the F-111 business 
not based on when the JSF comes in but on how the increase 
of the sum total of the risks of the F-111 play out.32
5.40 In its submission to the inquiry, Defence commented on the 
complexity of transitioning to the future NACC and the issue of risk 
and capability management: 
 
28  Dr Kopp and Mr Goon, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 117. 
29  Mr Michael Devlin, Submission No. 2, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 16. 
30  Mr Michael Devlin, Submission No. 2, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 17. 
31  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 54. 
32  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 52. 
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While Defence has confidence that the JSF will mature to 
meet the Air Force’s future air combat capability 
requirements, it is clear that cost, schedule and capability 
risks associated with introduction of the JSF decrease the later 
we acquire the aircraft.  It is also clear that cost, schedule and 
capability risks associated with the F/A-18 (and the F-111) 
increase the longer we keep the aircraft in service. From an 
overall Air Force air combat capability perspective, therefore, 
it is necessary to balance the two sets of risks: the ultimate 
aim being to maintain a regionally comparable Air Force air 
combat capability with manageable risk in the most cost 
effective way.33  
5.41 Subsequent to the public hearings, discussion in relation to the ‘gap’ 
and an ‘interim aircraft’ continued in both the general and specialist 
media.  
5.42 The Chief of Air Force was reported in November 2006 as 
acknowledging the potential for slippage of the JSF which had 
resulted in the development of contingency plans. These plans 
included an extension of the life of the F-111 up to around 2012, in 
lieu of around 2010, and the ongoing Hornet upgrade program. The 
Australian further reported that should the JSF be delayed by five 
years or more, the RAAF was expected to acquire the Super Hornet as 
the ‘interim aircraft.’34  
5.43 Indeed, during a media briefing in relation to the JSF program, the 
Deputy Chief of Air Force was questioned directly as to whether the 
Super Hornet was the preferred ‘interim aircraft’ to maintain 
Australia’s regional air superiority. Air-Vice Marshal Blackburn 
advised the following: 
… we’re confident that … we shouldn’t need an interim 
solution.  However, as with most things in Defence, we’re 
looking at contingency plans … that’s just prudent planning 
on our part … We’ve looked at a range of what is available on 
the market and what would suit us … So there’s [sic] a 
variety of options depending on what actually happens with 
the program.35
 
33  Department of Defence, Submission No. 15, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 6. 
34  Patrick Walkers, RAAF factors in expansion, The Weekend Australian, 25 November 2006, 
p. 2. 
35  Media Conference, Defence Update Briefing in relation to AIR 6000 Project, Canberra,  
10 October 2006. 
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5.44 Dr Kopp believes that the Super Hornet is not a viable contingency 
option: 
… the Super Hornet’s agility, supersonic speed and 
acceleration performance, critical in air combat, are not better 
than the earlier model [which Australia currently employs], 
due to a Congressional mandate during development. With 
unique engines, radar, airframe and electronic warfare 
systems, the Super Hornet shares little real commonality with 
its predecessor, driving up support costs. All it offers is better 
radar, improved avionics and 36 per cent more internal fuel, 
at a price tag estimated at $2.5 billion.36
Bridging the gap 
5.45 On 6 March 2007, the Government announced its decision to acquire 
24 F/A-18F Block II Super Hornet multi role aircraft in order to 
ensure Australia maintains its air combat capability edge and to 
complement the transition to the JSF.37 
5.46 The total program investment is approximately $6.6 billion over 13 
years, which includes acquisition, all support costs, and training for 
aircrew and maintenance personnel. Personnel will commence 
training on the platform in 2009 with the Super Hornets to be 
operational in 2010, coinciding with the withdrawal of the F-111.38 
Committee comment 
5.47 The unique nature of the JSF project, and Australia’s decision to join 
the SDD phase of the program, provides opportunities for Australian 
industry that would not be available if a more traditional capital 
acquisition strategy had been undertaken. 
5.48 Any potential for Australia’s regional air superiority to be diminished 
or in any way undermined because of slippages in the JSF program, 
(or the acquisition of some other new air combat platform), would be 
unacceptable. 
 
36  Dr Carlo Kopp, The Age, Flying into trouble, 30 December 2006. 
37  Minister for Defence Media Release 017/2007, $6 Billion to maintain Australia’s Regional 
Air Superiority, 6 March 2007. 
38  Minister for Defence Media Release B05/2007, Super Hornet Bridging Air Combat 
Capability, 8 May 2007. 
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5.49 The Committee notes the Government’s decision to purchase the 
Super Hornet to address any potential air combat capability 
superiority gap during the transition to the JSF.  
 
 
 6 
Australia’s Future Air Combat Aircraft 
Introduction 
6.1 The formal debate over which future air combat aircraft/force 
mixture will best ensure that the Australian Defence Force maintains 
regional air superiority began in 2000 with the release of the Defence 
2000—Our Future Defence Force and the subsequent establishment of 
the AIR 6000 project (NACC). The Government’s decision in 2002 to 
support the current future Air Force air combat plan did not quell that 
debate. Many submissions made to this inquiry contend that the 
Government’s decision was not the right one. 
6.2 This Committee examined the issue in its Review of the Defence Annual 
Report 2002-03. In Chapter 5 of that report there is a section titled ‘The 
comparative capability of the F-35 [JSF].’ This section outlined the 
JSF’s expected capabilities and compared them to air combat 
platforms, such as the Raptor, and other proposed force structures. 
6.3 As noted in the first chapter, Recommendation 3 of that report has 
resulted in this inquiry being referred from the Senate. Once again, 
the Committee has undertaken to examine the question of which 
future air combat aircraft/force mixture best addresses Australia’s 
needs with particular attention being paid to the comparative merits 
of the JSF and the Raptor. 
6.4 Dr Kopp, Mr Goon and others contended that the JSF alone will not 
satisfy Australia’s air combat capability needs. They propose a force 
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mixture of upgraded F-111s and Raptors.1 Defence and other private 
commentators believe that the Raptor, while a superior fighter in 
most ways is not multi-role and therefore is not as suited to 
Australia’s needs as the JSF.2 Other points were raised in relation to 
both aircraft. This chapter will summarise these discussions using 
three headings: 
 capabilities; 
 cost; and 
 availability. 
Capabilities 
6.5 Amongst the many capabilities of the JSF and the Raptor, three 
particular ones were brought to the attention of the Committee and 
discussed in some detail by witnesses. They were: 
 stealth; 
 range; and 
 networking. 
6.6 In reviewing this evidence, the Committee has remained cognisant of 
the need to consider capability issues in conjunction with the strategic 
concepts noted in Chapter 2. 
Stealth 
Rating 
6.7 In 2005, the US Department of Defence publicly released a 
PowerPoint presentation which noted that the JSF had low observable 
stealth characteristics. This terminology represented a change in the 
JSF’s stealth characteristics from what had previously been described 
as very low observable. This shift raised concern in Australia about 
the stealth capabilities of the JSF.3 
 
1  A complete discussion on the F-111s can be found in Chapter 3. 
2  Brian Weston, Submission No. 24, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 275. 
3  Sydney Morning Herald, Not so stealthy: the $15b fighters, 14 March 2006. 
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6.8 The Committee sought to clarify the meaning of any change in the 
stealth capability of the JSF, noting that one of the JSF’s selling points 
was its stealth capability and that a stealth downgrade would have 
negative implications.4 When asked for comment on this issue, 
Professor Babbage advised the Committee that there had been no real 
downgrade in stealth capability at all and, in fact, what had occurred 
was simply a change in terminology.5 
6.9 Defence corroborated Professor Babbage’s comments and advised the 
Committee that: 
… just this week the JSF Project Office changed the public 
releasable slide … There was a change in the terminology on 
one slide of the publicly released PowerPoint presentation. 
There was no change to the capability of the aircraft.6
6.10 Clarification of this point provided an opportunity for the Committee 
to discuss issues of stealth capability on the JSF and the Raptor. 
Comparative capability 
6.11 The most comprehensive comparison between the JSF and the Raptor 
was written by Air Marshal Angus Houston and published by ASPI 
in 2004. In the report, titled Is the JSF good enough?, Air Marshal 
Houston notes that the ‘F/A-22 sets new levels in stealth without 
having to compromise its aerodynamic performance.’7 
6.12 Dr Kopp and Mr Goon’s submission agrees. It notes that although the 
JSF is stealthy, its level of stealth has been compromised for a variety 
of factors and therefore does not compare to the high stealth 
capability of the Raptor.8 
6.13 It is worth noting, however, that the JSF will not have to face the 
Raptor in battle. Air Marshal Houston points out that: 
… we only have to do battle against F/A-22s in training 
exercises. Against 4th generation adversaries, the JSF has the 
decisive advantages of stealth and comprehensive situation 
 
4  Committee, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 35. 
5  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 35. 
6  Air Commodore John Harvey, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 48. 
7  Strategic Insights: ASPI, Is the JSF good enough?, August 2004, p. 6. 
8  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 204. 
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awareness, both from its onboard sensors and through the 
network.9
6.14 While the JSF doesn’t match the Raptors’ overall stealth capability, the 
JSF has considerable stealth capability. For example, it is ‘very 
stealthy on top’10 and is able to carry two 2,000 pound bombs in a 
stealth configuration.11 Its stealth capability is therefore an advantage 
when compared to current 4th generation aircraft. 
6.15 Dr Kopp and Mr Goon note that in regards to their proposed Evolved 
F-111, the JSF has an advantage in stealth.12 As is the case when the 
JSF is compared with the Russian Sukhoi Su-30 or Su-35 series of 
aircraft.13 
6.16 The JSF may have, on paper, superior stealth capability to most air 
combat aircraft currently in service. But what of the future? Dr Jensen 
MP posed a fundamental question to the Committee: ‘What happens 
when the threat aircraft are stealthy as well?’ He suggests that in such 
a case the JSF would be forced to engage the aircraft within visual 
range. The question then becomes, how well can the JSF perform in 
this circumstance?14 
6.17 This is the fundamental question concerning those who are opposed 
to a future air capability structure based solely on JSFs. 
Committee comment 
6.18 Australia must ensure that its next air combat aircraft purchase has 
comparable stealth capability to other combat aircraft in the region. 
Range 
6.19 The range of an aircraft raises several inter-related points which need 
to be taken into consideration when choosing the best air combat 
aircraft option for Australia. For example: 
 short range aircraft require refuelling and refuelling is done by 
tankers; 
9  Strategic Insights: ASPI, Is the JSF good enough?, August 2004, p. 8. 
10  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 31. 
11  Dr Alan Stephens, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 21. 
12  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 199. 
13  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 193. 
14  Dr Dennis Jensen MP, Submission No. 21, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 249. 
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 tankers need combat air patrols to protect them and those aircraft 
will need refuelling as well; 
 if the strike aircraft cannot adequately protect themselves, then 
further combat patrol aircraft will be required; and 
 the further the target, the further tankers, strike aircraft and 
combat patrol aircraft will have to push out and this has the effect 
of stretching network support such as the AEW&C aircraft. 
6.20 The Committee was advised that both future aircraft options 
discussed during the inquiry—the JSF and the Raptor—are, when 
compared to the F-111, short-ranged.15 Should the F-111 be retired as 
planned, either replacement, be it the JSF or Raptor would require 
tanker support at long range. 
6.21 Dr Jensen MP believes that Australian geography demands a longer-
range aircraft,16 but Defence pointed out that even though the F-111s 
have superior range, it is still forced to send its tankers far afield 
because the Hornets, which are currently used to protect the F-111s, 
need refuelling.17 
6.22 Like the Hornets, the JSF will need refuelling. Dr Jensen MP is 
concerned that the JSF’s short range will have a negative multiplying 
effect: 
A shorter range fighter requires that the tankers get closer to 
the target. This puts them into a more vulnerable position, 
requiring a larger [combat air patrol], which necessitates the 
need for more tankers.18
6.23 Dr Kopp and Mr Goon are concerned that the JSF will not be able to 
provide the necessary tanker protection. They believe that as the JSF 
goes farther a field with tanker support, the JSF’s air-to-air combat 
capability limits the protection it can afford itself and the tankers and 
therefore more would be required.19 
6.24 They maintain that their upgraded F-111/ Raptor proposal is better 
suited to the task. While the Raptor would need refuelling, its greater 
 
15  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 17. 
16  Dr Dennis Jensen MP, Submission No. 21, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 250. 
17  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 60. 
18  Dr Dennis Jensen MP, Submission No. 21, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 250. 
19  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 6. 
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combat effectiveness is such that fewer would be required to protect 
the F-111s and the tankers (as well as other aspects of the network).20 
6.25 Defence is confident that a ‘fully networked system of systems’, 
including the JSF will provide the necessary level of ‘knowledge 
dominance in the air battle space,’ which will enable Australian forces 
to ‘see first, shoot first, kill first.’21 
Networking 
6.26 All participants of the inquiry, the Committee included, agreed that 
network-centric warfare is the way of the future.22 As such, the 
Committee sought to compare the relative networking capabilities of 
the JSF and the Raptor. 
JSF 
6.27 On paper, it would appear that the JSF is a superior networking 
aircraft. Professor Babbage has stated that ‘no other aircraft has the 
ability to gather, process and share information that the JSF will 
have.’23 This should be of little surprise, as the JSF has been designed 
from the ground up for network-centric operations.24 
6.28 The JSF is equipped with a wide range of advanced sensors, many of 
which are reprogrammable by software.25 This will enable the JSF to 
adapt to a variety of contingencies and provide valuable surveillance 
capabilities—many of which we have not had in the past. For 
example, Professor Babbage noted that the JSF will be able to survey 
littoral environments with great clarity, simultaneously scanning for 
multiple items. 
6.29 Mr David Connery expanded on the surveillance options the JSF will 
provide. He envisioned its use in disaster relief operations, noting 
that the JSF would be able to survey damage areas and quickly relay 
that information back to decision makers.26 
 
20  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 17. 
21  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 60. 
22  The Committee and Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 7. 
23  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 24. 
24  Dr Alan Stephens, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 20. 
25  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 27. 
26  Mr David Connery, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 32. 
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6.30 This type of flexibility reflects the multi-roled nature of the JSF. 
Defence used a cricket analogy to make this point: 
[the JSF] is a very good all-rounder, a brilliant all rounder, 
across all the strategic tasks … that we develop.27
The Raptor 
6.31 The Raptor’s networking abilities were also discussed at the public 
hearing. Professor Babbage described the Raptor as a half-generation 
behind the JSF.28 Dr Stephens believes that in the ISR (Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) domain, the Raptor is lacking. For 
example, the Raptor does not have a transmit-receive data link, only a 
receive data link.29 
6.32 The Committee asked Dr Stephens about the possibility of upgrading 
the Raptor’s ISR capability and the potential cost of such an upgrade. 
Dr Stephens informed the Committee that the US has been upgrading 
the Raptor’s ground attack capabilities in order to make the cost of the 
Raptor justifiable and that he expects such upgrades to continue. He 
also commented that the additional cost of an ISR upgrade to the 
Raptor would be ‘very small.’30 
Committee comment 
6.33 General discussion on the comparative networking ability of the JSF 
and the Raptor indicates that the JSF is superior in this regard. This is 
best epitomised by the fact that the Raptor’s systems have been 
adapted and modified for the JSF. 
Cost 
6.34 There are many factors to be considered when examining the cost of 
the JSF. The US has established seven cumulative cost categories for 
the JSF described in the chart below: 
 
27  Mr Michael Pezzullo, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 58. 
28  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 30. 
29  Dr Alan Stephens, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 20. 
30  Dr Alan Stephens, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 24. 
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Figure 6.1 JSF cost definitions (US chart) 
  
Source : Department of Defence, Submission No. 27, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 299. 
6.35 Several different prices for the JSF have been quoted, each one based 
on a different cost definition. The Committee was particularly 
interested in the Average Unit Procurement Cost (AUPC) of the JSF 
which includes the average cost of the aircraft plus ancillary 
equipment, logistics support, training equipment and spares.  
6.36 The Committee was advised by Defence that the JSF AUPC is 
approximately US$67.3m per aircraft in 2005 prices (this is based on 
the average cost for all 3 variants of which the Australian variant 
(CTOL) is the cheapest). Defence noted that the quoted AUPC is 
based on the American model (shown in Figure 6.1) and is not an 
Australian unit projection cost, which would include specific 
Australian project requirements. It did note, however, that the above 
cost was ‘indicative of the relative cost of the [JSF] system versus 
other systems.’31 
6.37 Dr Kopp and Mr Goon provided their own costing in a submission to 
the Committee. They believe that, based on publicly available US 
Government documents, the AUPC of the CTOL variant of the JSF is 
US$81.3m per aircraft in 2004 prices.32 When they included an annual 
 
31  Department of Defence, Submission No. 27, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 294. 
32  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 105. 
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inflation factor of between one and three percent, they believe that the 
JSF AUPC could be as high as US$103m per aircraft in 2012.33 
6.38 Dr Kopp and Mr Goon further note that a ‘de-escalation in costs can 
usually be achieved when an aircraft is in full rate production.’34 
Australia plans to purchase the JSF at the beginning of the production 
cycle or curve, when costs could potentially be higher than later in the 
production curve. As a result, they contend that the purchase of 100 
Block 2 or 3 JSF could cost Australia somewhere between US$112m 
and US$120m per aircraft in 2012 dollars. When a projected exchange 
rate was added to this cost, they contend that the JSF could cost 
between A$160m and A$171.4m per aircraft in 2012 dollars.35 
6.39 Dr Kopp and Mr Goon contend that it would be cheaper for Australia 
to buy 55 Raptors in 2010 than 100 JSF in 2012. Their submission states 
that the cost of such a purchase would be US$126m per aircraft in 
2004 dollars.36 
6.40 Defence advised the Committee that the AUPC cost for the Raptor 
was US$175m per aircraft in 2005 prices.37 Dr Gumley of the Defence 
Materiel Organisation (DMO) further noted the potential update costs 
which could be attached to a Raptor purchase: 
… we would be paying substantial update costs. The 
aeroplanes coming out now are already in need of update in 
some areas because they have been out for many years. There 
are FMS costs, which is the charge the US government 
charges Australia to process the orders. Sometimes they 
waive those fees; sometimes they do not. We have not had the 
discussion yet but there is always the question of: do we have 
to pay our share of the past research and development and 
bringing it into manufacture? What is our share of the 
amortisation? The Americans will have about 183 or 184 F22s 
by the time they finish their program. If we were to get 40 or 
50 then we would be paying probably 20 per cent of the R&D 
costs of that aircraft. Maybe that will be waived it; maybe it 
will not be—we do not know—but that would add up to an 
extra $100 million per aeroplane.38
33  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 106. 
34  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 106. 
35  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 107. 
36  Air Power Australia, Submission No. 20, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 115. 
37  Department of Defence, Submission No. 27, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 294. 
38  Dr Stephen Gumley, Transcript 31 March 2006, pp. 49–50. 
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6.41 Dr Gumley’s sentiments were echoed in another submission which 
noted that ‘the F-22 is not a multi-role aircraft. Australia would either 
have to sacrifice strike capability or somehow fund an enormously 
expensive strike capability enhancement program.’39 
6.42 Mr Goon also raised the issue of operational costs in his discussion 
with the Committee. He believes that because the JSF is a smaller 
fighter, it has a reduced payload and combat effect. As a result, Mr 
Goon contends that the ADF will require a greater amount of JSF and 
tanker support in order to achieve its goals and, as such, operational 
costs will be higher.40 Both Dr Kopp and Mr Goon believe that a 
Raptor/F-111 force mix will have greater range and combat effect 
thereby reducing operational costs through greater efficiency.  
6.43 Defence has stated that the JSF alone is the ‘right choice’ because it is a 
multi-role, fifth generation strike fighter capable of fulfilling the 
Australia’s needs ‘at a cost that will allow the balanced development 
for the ADF of a broad range of capabilities in all environments.’41 
6.44 The Committee was advised in a separate submission that new 
aircraft types, such as the JSF, are increasingly flexible (multi-role) 
and reflect the need ‘to reduce the expensive logistic and support 
costs involved in operating two fleets of RAAF combat aircraft: 
Rationalisation of two such support systems into one means 
that more of Australia’s defence dollar can be spent on 
acquiring a credible number of operational platforms.42
Committee comment 
6.45 The above cost debate highlights the relative nature of aircraft cost 
analysis, as each analysis can be based on a series of different strategic 
and tactical considerations. 
6.46 Current price comparisons between the JSF and the Raptor reveal that 
the JSF is the cheaper product. The Committee recognises that the cost 
of the JSF may fluctuate; however, operational costs and multiple fleet 
maintenance costs must also be taken into account. 
 
39  Mr Brian Weston, Submission No. 24, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 275. 
40  Mr Peter Goon, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 15. 
41  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 39. 
42  Mr Brian Weston, Submission No. 24, Sub. Vol. 1, p. 274. 
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Availability 
Technology transfer 
6.47  The issue of US technology transfers is of particular importance to 
Australia. Current US laws do not allow for the transfer of sensitive 
stealth technology to participating JSF program partners. Britain and 
Australia have been lobbying the US to change its technology transfer 
laws to ensure that both countries can independently operate and 
support their JSFs upon purchase.43 
6.48 Professor Babbage told the Committee that in his view, Australia 
must gain access to the capacity to modify and adapt the JSF for its 
particular needs.44 He believes that there will be occasions when 
Australia will need to use the JSF in different ways to the US: 
We need to be able to modify the sensor’s software so that if 
we want it to look for something else or report in a different 
format to fit in with something else on one of our Wedgetail 
aircraft or something like that we can make it happen.45
6.49 The Committee asked Defence to comment on its position in relation 
to this matter and was advised that: 
Australia will not enter the MoU for the Production, 
Sustainment and Follow-on Development (PSFD) phase 
unless we are assured of necessary access to technology and 
data to operate and support the JSF aircraft.46
Committee comment 
6.50 The Committee notes that upon signing the PSFD MoU in December 
2006, Defence stated that ‘the MoU and associated documents also 
43  Britain in clash over US fighter secrets, 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-2-2086523-2,00.html>  
(Accessed 15 March 2006);  and The World Today – Strike Fighter purchase suffers setback, 
<http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2006/s1592291.html>  
(Accessed 16 March 2006). 
44  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 34. 
45  Professor Ross Babbage, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 34. 
46  Department of Defence, Submission No. 27, Sub. Vol. 2, p. 298. 
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guarantees Australia’s access to the technology and data it needs to 
operate and support the JSF.’47 
Is the Raptor for sale? 
6.51 The Committee is not aware of a formal request from the Government 
to purchase the Raptor but notes that the United States is not allowed, 
by law, to pursue its sale with other countries.48 
6.52 At Senate Additional Estimates in February 2007, Defence confirmed 
that the US Deputy Defence Secretary, Gordon England wrote to the 
Australian Defence Minister, Brendan Nelson, confirming that the  
Raptor is not available for export sales.49 
6.53 Furthermore, Defence told the Committee that even if it was released 
by the US Government for export, it is not the preferred choice 
because it ‘has limited ability in strike and even less utility and 
capability for offensive air support.’50 
Committee comment 
6.54 This chapter summarises the debate heard by the Committee over the 
comparative merits of the JSF and Raptor. Each aircraft is unique and 
is designed to serve different purposes; therefore, comparisons can be 
problematic and often remain general in nature. The Committee notes 
Dr Kopp’s belief that: 
While the joint strike fighter is being marketed as a multi-role 
fighter, it is being developed mostly to hunt battlefield 
targets, with air defence as a secondary role. Otherwise the 
United States would not have built the F22 Raptor. As a result 
the joint strike fighter will have limited performance, limited 
agility and limited stealth compared to the F22. Put simply, it 
is too small and its performance and stealth will not be good 
enough.51
 
47  Minister for Defence Media Release 163/2006, Australia Enters Next Phase of the JSF 
Program, 13 December 2006. 
48  Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Estimates, Estimates 
Hearing, Transcript 31 May 2006, p. 32. 
49  Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Estimates, Additional 
Estimates Hearing, Transcript 14 February 2007, p. 24. 
50  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 39. 
51  Dr Carlo Kopp, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 2. 
 
AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE AIR COMBAT AIRCRAFT 67 
 
 
6.55 The Committee also notes Air Marshal Shepherd’s comments 
regarding a potential Australian purchase of the Raptor: 
… there is no doubt that it will be the world’s best air 
superiority fighter. If we were living in a hypothetical world 
and it was available, which it is not, and we could afford it, 
which we can but it would distort the budget, the F22 and the 
JSF would give us a better air superiority capability in the air-
to-air role. There is no doubt about that. But at what cost? 
What cost to government in distorting other government 
programs, what cost to Defence in distorting our own 
capability budget and a balanced ADF … [the Raptor] comes 
at a cost—of maintenance people, different aircrew et cetera. 
So it becomes a logistics, training and engineering cost to 
what is by world standards a moderate sized but First World 
capable air force.52
6.56 Notwithstanding the availability, or otherwise, of the Raptor for sale, 
the Committee notes Defence is firmly of the view that the JSF 
provides the best capability versus cost whilst maintaining a balanced 
ADF.  
 
 
 
 
Senator Marise Payne 
Chair 
15 August 2007 
52  Air Marshal Geoff Shepherd, Transcript 31 March 2006, p. 60. 
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